Directive

Object and Policy.

This directive is designed to cover three objectives:

A) Maxium disruption of the enemy telecommunication system during the phase of his ejaction from that country.

B) Minimum damage to the telecommunication system, to allow quick restoration for Allied military and civil use.

C) Counter measures to prevent to enemy from appying his "scorch" policy to the telecommunication system.

Telecommunications are of vital importance to the enemy, for they arry his movement and deployment orders, and his intelligence. It could be said that no movement by land, sea or air can be carried out in good time without telecommunications. Wireless does not and cannot take its place.

The telecommunications system is very complex and consists of basic long distance routes terminating in the local networks of the town or small areas. It has been found that the most effective hindrance to the enemy is obtained, not by eliminating the telecommunications network, but by reducing its reliability to such extent as to create heavy congestion, with consequent breakdown of the system and the complete dispersal of the maintenance troops.

The enemy, pre-eminently aware of the vulnerability of peacetime sysyems, has taken adequste precautions to duplicate vital centres, such as Repeater Stations and Trunk Exchanges and to provide alternatives to such long distance routes on which he depends. Main towns, that will be subjected to early bombardment and through which pass these long distance routes are ringed with perimeter cables, so that telephone traffic may be by-passed round the town should the latter be damaged and the cables or routes cut.

Further, the enemy, having suffered in France and Belgium through the loss of telecommunication by sabotage, is guarding the networks even more carefully than before.

Experience has shown that attacks on selected strategic routes well away from focal centres produce more effective results than direct attacks on major installations such as Repeater Stations and Telephone Exchanges. The latter mearly always involves fighting, unnecessary loss of life and heavy reprisals. Attacks in the country districts allow more freedom of movement for sabotage parties, with better changes of escape. Such attacks, being so widespread, disperse the enemy's repair, with the consequent lack of their control.

Wholesale destruction to the network is useless, because frequently routes are cut that do not play any part in the German Military network. Moreover, attacks on vital routes must be limited and controlled, since they will be urgently needed by Allied Armies for operational purposes and by Civil Administrative bodies to prevent distress and disorder among the population. It is stressed that stores of telecommunications material and heavy installations be left intact and not sabotaged and in addition protected from German destruction on their retreat.

Method.

With these instructions in mind it is clear that the plan must consist of two parts:

1) Direct sabotage, to attack and temporarily disrupt strategic routes.

2) Counter sabotage, to protect valuable plant, stores and particularly records of such key installations, from destruction by the Germans.

1. Direct sabotage.

As it has alreay been stated, sabotage of telecommunications is to be directed towards attacks on the strategic routes in the open country.

Strategic routes can be classified into two categories:

a) Overhead Lines.

Main overhead line routes usally follow railways and consist of either copper or bronze wires or lead covered cable, suspended from a steal wire between wooden poles some 8 metres in height and 50 metres apart.

Most sabotage attacks of this type will aim at felling the pole and can be effected with such implements as axes, saws, etc. It is as well to remember that when the wires or cable were originally put up, the great strain exerted on the of the poles was counteracted by so-called stays or guys of heavy guage iron or steel wire. When cutting down a pole these stays may be encountered, thus a hacksaw will be required to cut them.

When selecting the area of attack it is better to find some spot where the routes follow a bend. By cutting down the central pole in the bend, it will be found that the other poles will come down as well, since the greatest strain is exerted at this point.

If explosives are available they may be used. A necklace of explosives should be placed around the poles approximately 18" from the base. Care should be taken that the supporting stays are cut.

Whether the axe or the explosive method is used, at least four poles should be brought down. Care should be taken that the wire or cable is useless and beyond repair, either by rupture or removal of good lengths of wire. It may be possible to dump such wire in a nearby canal.

If possible, the enemy repair party that may be sent out to retify the fault should be ambushed, captured, or eliminated, because they are skilled personnel who cannot be replaced easily.

b) Underground cables.

Underground cables nearly always follow the side of main roads, usually about one metre in from the edge, but undoubttedly the enemy has buried some along secondary roads and even across country. As its nature implies, this type of cable is either lead covered, or armoured with wrapping of steel wire. The depth at which it is buried is, on an average, 80 cms.

Up to 1939 marking stones placed at regular intervals were used to indicate the side of the road on which the cable was buried. Normally they are placed immdiately over the cable, but where this is impossible the inscription on the sone will indicate the position. It has been found that the Germans have not used these marking stones since the outbreak of hostilities, but, however, have left intact those already in existence.

Sabotage on such cables presents several problems, the chief of which is that the precise position of the cable is not known. Careful reconnoitering of the proposed site for attack is essential. If marking stones are not present, then by questioning local inhabitants or contacting the local Post Office people, the necessary information may be obtained.

Having found the approximate course of the cable, a trench must be dug. Digging may result in questions being asked by the enemy. This can be overcome by using Post Office people to assist and pretending that repairs are being carried out. It is usual for a written order to be carried by one of a repair gang. This can be obtained from co-operative Post Office engineers.

Since digging takes some time, it is advisable to prepare the trench before the actual date of attack. The trench may be left open and excuses made stating that repairs are being carried out. However boards can be placed over the top, with a dovering of earth as camouflage.

At the time of the attack, two methods can be used to cut the cable:

a) Using a hacksaw or axe.

b) By using explosives: in this case two 1½ lb. plastic charges placed 1 metre apart on the cable are necessary.

Note. In either case (a or b) a length of cable approximately 1 metre must be removed. A single cut can easily be repaired in a short space of time. Whenever possible the damaged end of of the cable should be put in water. Only a little of the latter is necessary to put any lead covered cable completely out of action.

c) Countersabotage.

The enemy during his retreat will do everything within his power to damage or destroy telecommunications routes and installations.

One favourite practice is to destroy or remove records held in Installation Offices, Trunk Exchanges and Repeater Stations. To ensure that the Allied Armies will have no chance of a quick restoration of the telecommunications system, key personnel and technicians are removed or killed.

Both records and key personnel must be safeguarded.

However possible no Post Office employee should take part in active sabotage, thus risking the chance of capture or death. They can, however, be approached in order to obtain information, such as cable routing, etc.

These personnel are in position to find out the enemy's intentions for destruction on retreat. Normally, in addition to the removal of records, charges are placed in readiness to blow up vital equipment in telephone exchanges and repeater stations.

They should be removed or neutralised. Technicians must remove essential components in the Post Office building's records and hide them until the area is taken over by the Allies.

It is stressed that the records and the technicians are needed by the Allies on the occupation of enemy held territory and must be instructed to hide until they can assist the Allied Forces in restoring telecommunications.

d) Sabotage Plan.

From the foregoing it is clear that the selection of the precise location and pinpointing of the actual target must be left to the people on the spot. The execution of telecommunications sabotage will therefore be carried out in four phases:

Firstly, the reconnoitering and selection of the point of attack.

Secondly, the reporting back of the chosen point of attack, using map references and instituting of preliminary work for carrying out sabotage (digging of cable trench, etc).

Thirdly, the actual carrying out of the sabotage act on receipt of specific instructions.

Fourthly, reporting back of the work carried out and precise location.

It is essential that these four phases be strictly observed; in particular, that if and sabotage is undertaken and successfully carried out, it be reported back, giving actual date. A list of the telecommunication routes selected as suitable subjects for sabotage attacks will be furnished for the various distrects concerned.

The list has been drawn up on the basis of the latest information available, but in order that it may be kept up to date and supplemented, it would be of great value if such Intelligence would be supplied from the field as frequently as possible: such information should comprise:

1) The precise routing of underground telephone cables.

2) The details of the number of pairs; if lead covered or armoured; maker; distance ends; and the Repeater Stations on the route.

3) Location of telephone exchangers and Repeater Stations.

4) Location od Signal offices of the enemy's formations.

                                                                                                TARGETS.

A. UNDERGROUND CABLES.

1) Between STAPHORST and LICHTMIS; this is the ZWOLLE - MEPPEL cable along road L-M (State number).

2) Between HAARLE and NIJVERDAL; this is the ZWOLLE - ALMELO cable along road P.

3) Between DEVENTER and BATHMEN; this is the DEVENTER - HENGELO cable along road R.

4) Between LAREN and JOPPE; this the DEVENTER - LOCHEM cable, German-laid; no state number for road, which runs from Deventer through Epse
    and Laren and Lochem.

5) Between DEVENTER and GIETEL; this is the DEVENTER - ZUYPHEN cable, along road Deventer-Gietel-Appen-Zutphen.

B. OVERHEAD LINES.

1) Between STAPHORST and LICHTMIS (along ZWOLLE-MEPPEL railway).

2) Between DALFSEN and OMMEN (along ZWOLLE-MARIENBERG railway).

3) Between DAALERVEEN and ALMELO ( alonf MARIENBERG-ALMELO railway).

4) Between HAARLE and NIJVERDAL (along ZWOLLE-ALMELO railway).

5) Between DEVENTER and BATHMEN (along DEVENTER-ALMELO railway).

6) Between EEFDE and LOCHEM (along ZUTPHEN-HENGELO railway).

7) Between VORDEN and RUURLO (along ZUTPHEN-WINTERSWIJK railway).

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