MARINUS VAN DER STOEP.
transcription
24th January, 1945
INTERROGATION OF ROB @ MAGNUS VAN SCHELVEN
@ VAN SEVENHUIZEN
@ De WIT
@ RIEN
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding ROB's arrival in the UK and prevailing at that time, his interrogation has been carried out in two parts. For the purpose of conciseness and easy reference, however, the report of both interrogations included in this document by arrangement with the Security Authorities who carried out the first of these.
EARLY LIFE.
Van Schelven went to elementary school at Rotterdam and this was followed by HBS and engineering school. By then continued with evening classes at technical school while by day, for his practical work, he was employed with the V.I.R. electric lamp works, with which firm he remained until 1939. Thereupon he obtained employment with the JANIN confectionery factory, where he became chief of the technical department and drawing office. Since the end of 1941/beginning 1942 he had been allowing his work to drop off, only going in for a few days each week. This was possible in his position in order to devote himself to resistance work.
START OF RESISTANCE WORK.
He states that he had already commenced in this field during the disastrous days of May 1940, when Naval personnel were assisted by him, together with Frits RUYS, a student of economics (since killed) and son of the RUYS Handelsvereeniging of Wassenaar or Voorburg and Annie VAN ALPHEN of the Wildeveenstraat, Rotterdam, who was later VAN SCHELVEN's courier. This group of students clubbed together under Pa RIEDE, proprietor of the student's boarding- house at 21 Claas de Vrieslaan, Rotterdam.
This was the beginning of VAN SCHELVEN's clandestine work and was followed by assistance to students, military personnel and Jews; he also worked successively with:
"VRIJ NEDERLAND"
"TROUW"
"ONS VOLK"
Contact with "VRIJ NEDERLAND" was through Charles Van der SLUIS, a student of economics and son of Harbour works director of 52 or 54 Vredenhoflaan, Kralingen. the leader of "TROUW" is described as being a certain DRIES and contact with him was via HAN and WIM, two other students of economics and contacts of Van der SLUIS. Contact with "ONS VOLK" was also via Van der SLUIS and VAN SCHELVEN adds that the chief editor was HAN, already referred to, while they all contributed to it and VAN SCHELVEN further assisted with the distribution.
Other persons mentioned in connection with his work are:
Max PINO. Son of a Netherlands Indies official of Koningsplein, The Hague and who is a contact man with the I.D. (Dutch Intelligence Services).
Huib or Huug de YONG. Mechanical engineer and son of a former Mayor of Semarang, Netherlands Indies. DE YONG lives in Vijverlaan, Rotterdam. He is said to have 2 brothers in the UK.
LATER DEVELOPMENTS.
According to VAN SCHELVEN, through their journalistic work they they found that they learned that a lot of things could be done and therefore decided to form a ROTTERDAM KP sabotage group and the following were added:
1. Frans DIJKSHOORN. Son of the director of the clothing business of that name of the Binnenweg, Rotterdam whom the son has superseded in this function. Their address is at Hillegersberg, Rotterdam.
2. 'CHRIS', age 28-32. Student of economics and a native of Twenthe.
This occurred about the end of 1943/beginning of 1944 and the group was known as the KP of RIEN (Van Schelven). The latter mentions that there were other groups i.e. that of Paul ESMEIJER, engineering school teacher, Rotterdam. Who had with him a certain 'ANTON', student and 'THEO', a baker by profession. Then there was the group of Cornelis BITTER @ KEES-ZUID, about whose case VAN SCHELVEN produced a memorised report to 21st Army Group. BITTER, who was also a student, had in his group 'KLEINE JAN', BOERE PIET and 'EDDY'.
THE STAND OF THE PRESENT REGIME.
In June 1944, it became essential to co-ordinate te working of the various groups and Paul ESMEIJER became leader of the ROTTERDAM KP. VAN SCHELVEN, in the name of ROB, superseded him about September 1944 as it was found that he was not cut out for this job.
They carried on their sabotage work, passing the products of their raids, such as rations cards, identity cards, etc to the LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE (LO). This man's real name id Georges of Theo ELSINGA, aged 45/50, he is a former head of the 'FRIESCHE DAGBLAD' (newspaper) of 189? Mathenesserlaan, Rotterdam and described as a personal friend of the Dutch Minister in this country, Professor GERBRANDY.
CONTACT WITH LONDON.
VAN SCHELVEN states that the KP had radio contact with the UK through the liaison officer 'LEO'(note: presumably RUMMY) (Bert de Goede) sent from the UK in August 1944 and who had two operators, one of whom was called 'EDU' (Barmé) and was also dropped back, while the other was 'COR' (Bijsterveld), a locally recruited Merchant Navy mate and produced by 'JOSE' (Elsinga), whose operator he also was.
Contacts also existed with the RVV Organisation through the Rotterdam leader 'Maarten' and 'GERRIT'. the latter is said by VAN SCHELVEN to be Captain HOOGEVEEN, who has been to the UK and is now in Brussels with Prince Bernhard. VAN SCHELVEN further refers to the OD Organisation in the person of 'LANGE WILLEM', who is Willem VAN WIJLEN, an ex-officer and director of CITAX or CITO, transport company of ROTTERDAM and described as leader of the ROTTERDAM OD.
Owing to friction which existed between KP, RVV and OD an attempt - in which VAN SCHELVEN modestly admits he was very successful - was made by him to get all these movements working as one whole and in harmony. he states that instructors were sent out first from the UK and he arranged for these to instruct representatives from the various organisations together, after which they were sent out to instil everywhere the feeling of mutual confidence, which it had been possible to produce in them.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR LEAVING HOLLAND.
Finally there was a meeting at ROTTERDAM about six weeks ago, at which the following were presented:
1. 'PAUL' representative from DORDRECHT.
2. 'TREES' representative from DORDRECHT.
3. 'OOM PIET' leader of the WESTLAND.
4. 'PIET' leader of the WESTLAND.
5. 'DIRK' leader of the WESTLAND.
6. The Gewestelijk Commandant, VAN DER HORSS, whose real name is VAN DER HOEVE, director of a seed merchants
company of Wijnhaven, ROTTERDAM.
7. 'JOSE' mentioned above, leader of LO.
8. 'KAREL' whose real name is VAN SYPESTEYN, a former Dutch Consul in Sweden or Norway, Leader of LO.
9. GEERTSEMA, Gewestelijk Commandant of the OD, whose real name is ROODENBURG, former artillery officer and
ROTTERDAM accountancy.
10. BOS, real name HOLLAAR Leader of the Nat. Steun Fonds for South-Holland, which is the organisation that provides
the financial assistance.
11. 'HANS' of the KP, who has already been mentioned and who is VAN SCHELVEN's deputy.
It seems that, impressed with VAN SCHELVEN's ability, it was generally agreed that he should be the one who should be sent across to unoccupied territory to the Allied Forces. The reason for this were military co-ordination, close radio contact so that everything would be ready when the push came, the question of arms, dropping ground, etc and the discussion of the political aide with the Allied Staff and finally to consult Queen Wilhelmina.
It was further decided that it was desirable for two to go, and VAN SCHELVEN was asked whom he would like to accompany him. He selected 'JOSE' for whom he had much respect as an older sober thinking man, who would help to steady his own youthful enthusiasm, Further, of course. 'JOSE' was well-connected and generally considered by VAN SCHELVEN to be the most suitable person. Unfortunately, he was to fall ill on the way.
CROSSING THE LINES.
They left ROTTERDAM at 17:00 hours on Saturday afternoon, 06-01-1945, but had to spent the night at Rijsoord owing to conditions. From here they continued on the Sunday morning via Zwijndrecht and Dordrecht. On the night of Sunday/Monday they made an attempt to get through from Sliedrecht through the canals by means of a canoe provided by the ALBRECHTS Group of the I.D. courier service, but owing to a snow-storm were unable to make it and had to return to Sliedrecht, where 'JOSE' fell ill.
On Monday/Tuesday night VAN SCHELVEN set off again in one canoe accompanied by 'WITTE PIET', a courier from the Allies who was in another. Unfortunately, VAN SCHELVEN's canoe capsized and he had to swim ashore. It was arranged that 'PIET' should return to ROTTERDAM, while VAN SCHELVEN continued in his canoe to arrive at 01:15 hours at Lage Zwaluwe on 09-01-1945. Here he was picked up by the Americans and after being placed in the OD barracks was subsequently transported via Wagenberg and Breda to Tilburg and from there 3 days later to Eindhoven, where he was seen by the Dutch Intelligence Service. He then proceeded to BRUSSELS for a few days, where he was seen at the headquarters of 21st Army Group and Prince Bernhard's HQ, he was despatched by plane to the UK on 17-01-1945.
DEVELOPMENTS IN HOLLAND DURING ROB'S ABSENSE.
Since the departure of ROB from Holland, mant things had happened which had given rise to a certain amount of anxiety in London, foremost among them a series of messages from the SOE liaison officer in ROTTERDAM, RUMMY (de Goede), which told a tale of the attempted intimidation of this agent by the SD. This series of messages was of course, quite unknown to ROB; the interrogator therefore showed them to him so that he might be fully informed and in a position to give an estimate of the true position from his first-hand knowledge of the arrangements in the field.
PERSONALITIES.
Before studying the traffic, however, ROB identified certain photographs; without hesitation he pointed out the under-mentioned and gave the names by which he knew them in the field, which names were in some cases unknown in London.
Operational Name. Remarks. Field Name (used by ROB).
RUMMY Liaison officer LEO
COURSING (Fritz) Instructor WIM
LUDO LUDO.
PODEX Now in Germany KOOS.
SNOOKER Local recruit, trained in UK and returned to Holland WITTE PIET.
SHOOTING Instructor RVV LODEWIJK.
CRIBBAGE (Theodore) Captured by SD NOL
CUBBING BEN.
After some hesitation source also picked out:
TRAPPING WT operator RUMMY EDU
RECEPTIONS.
Source's earliest contact with CUBBING (Cieremans) and BOATING (Polak) was when he collected them from the reception Committee; he also was responsible for the reception of RUMMY, and GRIBBAGE although he could not remember whether they actually arrived in the field together or came at fairly close intervals after each other. Before they came source said that there was another man (who he insists was dropped alone) who was dropped in the EDE district who was known to WITTE PIET before the war. At the time, it was thought that there was something wrong with this man, whose name source never knew; on WITTE PIET's recommendation, all contact with him was severed. On account of this, source does not know what he did in the Field, but said that he heard later that the man was shot by the SD.
(NOTE: It is thought that this unknown man must have been FARO (Celosse), which supposition is strengthened by the fact that source thinks that his name might have been BOB. FARO was, of course, not dropped alone, but the time and circumstances all points to his being identical with the man referred to by source. Too much attention should not be paid to source's statement that he came alone, since source admits that he only heard about the case from WITTE PIET in conversation on Friday 5th January 1945.
This is very confusing since Bob Celosse (organiser, alias BOB, mission FARO) was dropped 'blind' in the Wieringermeer Polder in North-Holland on the night of 1st April 1944 together with Tony Cnoops (organiser, alias Coster, mission Cricket), Huub Sanders (WT operator to Cnoops, alias Curling or Ivo, mission Swale) and Johan Seijben (organiser, alias Schouten, mission Ping-Pong).
Aart Penning refused to jump (WT operator to Celosse, mission FARO).
Celosse was arrested 19-05-1944 in Amsterdam, Cnoops was arrested 19-05-1944, Sanders was arrested 19-05-1944 and Seijben was also arrested on 19-05-1944.
THE RUMMY TRAFFIC.
The course of the RUMMY traffic was followed with source, concerning at the 11th January 1945, when the following message was received:
B.212715. 11-01-1945.
HAVE NOW CONTACT WITH COURIER STER IF THEODORE RPT THEODORE STOP HE WAL SHNT THORS BY SD RPT SD STOP HANBOOK RPT HANBOOK IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST SD RPT SD MEN STOP HE WANT TO JALK WITH ME STOP WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED STOP
Have now contact with Courier. Is Theodore repeat Theodore. He wil (mutilated) by SD repeat SD. Haubrock repeat Haubrok is one of the highest SD repeat SD. He want to talk with me. Will keep you informed.
Source said that he knew already that the courier TIENE had been allowed to go home after having been interviewed by the Gestapo. The text of the message did not surprise him since he said that if followed very closely the course which the Germans had adopted after the arrest of BITTER. When this man, who was a close friend of ROB's was arrested, the Gestapo sent a message in which WOLK asked for an interview with ROB. WOLK promised to come without arms and said that after an hour's talk he was sure that there would be no further cause for enmity between them.
B.2164/20 of 12th January 1945.
EHFERENCE TINE RPT TINE COURIERSTER OF THEODORE STOP SHE CAM TO ME AND TALK TO ME IN THE NAME OF HAXBOOK RPT HAUBOOK STOP I HAVE HAD ULTIMATUM OF SD RPT SD STOP CAPITUAL CAPITULATE FOR FRIDAY NIGHT TWELFTH JANFARY OR THEODORE KAREL RPT KAREL TONY RPT TONY AND THIRTY RPT THIRTY UNDERGROUND MEN WILL BE KILLED STOP SORDY I WILL MATRY ON RPT YARRY ON STOP ALL PEOPLE SENT BY YOU ARE KNOWN BB SD RPT WU STOP PLEASE WARN HANS RPT HANS FOR SD RPT SD KNOW I HIM BY HEART STOP SD RPT SD KNOWS NAMES LIKE DUIKER RPT SUIKER AND BOREL RPT BOREL STOP I THOUGHT THESE NAMES WERE ONLY KNOWN IN ENGLAND AND NOT HZJE STOP VAN DIR WAALS ALIAS TONY DE WILDE WAS CALLED IN THIS CONNECTION STOP SD RPT SD KNOWS EVERYTHING ABOUT DUTCH COUNTRY SECTION AND POSITION OF SPECIAL TRAINING SCHOOLS STOP CAPT KIZGRWTKING WAL ALSO CALLED STOP SEND YOU MORE INFORMATION STOP CHEERIO".
Reference Tiene repeat Tiene courier of Theodore. She came to me and to me in the name of Haubrok repeat Haubrok. I have had a ultimatum of SD repeat SD. Capitulate before Friday night 12th January or Theodore, Karel repeat Karel, Tony repeat Tony and 30 resistance men will be killed. Sorry I will carry on repeat carry on. All people sent by you are known by SD repeat SD. Please warn Hans repeat Hans for SD repeat SD they know him by heart. SD repeat SD knows names like Duiker repeat Duiker and Borel repeat Borel. I thought these names were only known in England and not here. Van der Waals alias Tony de Wilde was mentioned in this connection. SD repeat SD knows everything about Dutch Country Section and locations of the Special Training Schools. Captain (mutilated) was also mentioned. Will send you more information. Cheerio.
THEODORE is Arie van Duyn, KAREL is Gerrit Reisiger, TONY is Tony Visser and HANS is agent/organiser Tobias Biallosterski.
BOREL is Jan Bockma (WT Operator to Verhoef, alias Halma, mission Fives-I) plane crashed near Makkum in IJsselmeer killing all four agents on board including Pleun Verhoef (organiser for RVV, alias Racquets, mission Fives-I)
DUIKER is Cees Dekkers (organiser, alias Poker) his plane crashed close to airfield Gilze-Rijen, killing all on board.
After the receipt of the first message it would appear as though RUMMY had left a message at the boits-aux-lettres through which TIENE had contacted him and had arranged an address at which he would meet her. Source said that he was quite sure that RUMMY would not have gone to the meeting on 12th January without a bodyguard of source's men. He also gave it as his opinion that it would have been quite impossible for the Germans to have followed RUMMY away from the meeting place, even if they had succeeded in following TIENE to it, which was unlikely.
Source explained that when RUMMY had arranged to meet TIENE he would have followed out the normal procedure which would be to give her an address, it might even be only a street corner, at which she would be picked up by a member of the organisation who would pass her over to another at a second rendez-vous and this would happen perhaps five times in all before she reached the home where RUMMY was to meet her: each man would take all precautions to prevent the Germans following. On leaving the meeting RUMMY would be followed by his bodyguard and would take care to cross some of the deserted parts of ROTTERDAM, areas which the Gestapo will never follow armed men, and then lose himself in the crowds on the BINNENWEG or some other busy street. The home at which the meeting took place would obviously be told to the Germans by TIENE, but would never be used again.
Information contained in the message of 12th January.
Source was not at all surprised to see the names etc, which Rummy says are known to the Germans, because he says he knows that GRIBBAGE (NOL), who was arrested on or about 20th December, 1944 told all that he knew to the Germans almost at once and that TIENE, courier did the same.
At the time of TIENE's enlistment by GRIBBAGE there had been some question on to whether or not she was a suitable person for the work which she was to do, but GRIBBAGE had been loud in her praise and very anxious to have her services; she had been taken on the strength of this and everything had gone well right up until the time of the arrest. they had never had any doubts about or fears for GRIBBAGE's security and the first thing that they knew of anything being wrong was the news of his arrest. Within half an hour of the arrest of GRIBBAGE and TIENE, TIENE was seen by members of the organisation driving around ROTTERDAM in a car with the Gestapo, pointing out all the addresses which she knew. Very shortly afterwards, GRIBBAGE himself made a public appearance walking alone in the streets, but followed at about 15 yards by two SD men, his job being to go up and speak to any person he knew to be engaged in resistance work, and all people so accosted by him were immediately arrested.
B. 2244/39. 14th January 1945.
"NEW GROUND WINTON STOP DUTCH MIL MAP SHEET FOURTY THREE WILLEMSTAD ISSUE NINETEEN ELEVEN STOP THREE NINE POINT SIX AND SEVEN ZERO POINT FOUR RPT THREE NINE POINT SIX AND SEVEN ZERO POINT FOUR STOP WHEN IS ROB RPT ROB COMIN BACK STOP"
New dropping ground Winston. Dutch military map, sheet 43 Willemstad, issued at 1911. 39.6 and 70.4 repeat 39.6 and 70.4. When is ROB repeat ROB coming back?
Source stated that when he was preparing to leave Holland he had arranged that RUMMY that if he was not back in 10 or 14 days, RUMMY should ask UK when he was to be expected. Nevertheless, source is not surprised at seeing this question being asked after only 8 das. He says that it is more or less obvious from the previous messages that RUMMY has had his nerves very severely shaken and under the circumstances, it is not surprising that he is beginning to feel that things are going very wrong and does not know what to do for the best. His indecision and the need for ROB's speedy return is better understood when it is realised that ROB is the only person who has full knowledge of the plans for ROTTERDAM.
In the earlier days of the work in ROTTERDAM the plans which it was hoped to put into effect at the right moment were known to several people, but these plans fell into te hands of the Germans through the arrest of one of the men who knew them. After this occurrence, ROB decided to guard against a repetition and decided to give people only just so much information as they needed for the carrying out of their work from day to day, the result being that he is now the only person who knows all the working of his organisation or its ultimate objectives.
B.2259/4 15th January 1945.
RUMMY reports the capture of the Central Weapon Magazine and also gives an address from which PODEX has written in GERMANY:
"WILL DO ALR UTMOST YOUR TWO FIVE NINE AND TWO SIX ZERO STOP ADDRESS INNOCENT LETTER GERARD RPT GERARD STOP LCDY KERMAN BAHNHOF BAMBERG ABTZU BEGLEITER BAMBER NORIBAYERN STOP CHEVROLET RPR CHEVROLET READY TO VECEIVE STEP GOT JUST MESSAGE CTNTRAA CWAPENMA GAZYTOP NBS RPT NBS IN HAUDS OD SD RPT SD STOP"
Will do our utmost referring to your telegrams 259 and 260. Address innocent letter GERARD (Mulholland) repeat GERARD. (mutilated) (mutilated) Bahnhof Bamberg (mutilated) Begleiter Bamberg North Bayern. Ground Chevrolet repeat Chevrolet is ready to receive containers. Just got a message Central Weapon Magazine from the NBS repeat NBS fell in the hands of the SD repeat SD.
The telegrams from the UK referred to to had to do with attacks on V-weapons. GERARD is PODEX and the address which gives is Leonard G. DIJKERMAM, Bahnhof Bamberg, Oberbayern. This address is identical with that on postcard received in UK from PODEX. the central weapon magazine of the NBS is on a small ship which is moved about from place to place.
In source's opinion the capture of this weapon store would be very disturbing to RUMMY and to the other members of the organisation because they would not know what to do about the second of their stores. There are other stores but the knowledge of these source keeps to himself for the security reasons mentioned above and he does not think that there is anyone in ROTTERDAM at the moment who could handle these matters properly in his absence. Very silly!!
B. 2258/62 15th January 1945.
"SD RPT SD KNOWS EVERYTHING ABOUT LODEWYK RPT LODEWYK STOP HAVE WARNED HIM ROTTERDAM IS TO DANGEROUS FOR HIM STOP LUDO RPR LUDO EDU RPT EDU AND WIM RPT WIM STILL UNKNOWN STOP HOW IS THE BABY STOP"
The SD repeat SD knows everything about LODEWIJK (Luykenaar) repeat LODEWIJK stop We have warned him that Rotterdam is too dangerous for him. LUDO (de Stoppelaar) repeat LUDO, EDU (Barmé) repeat EDU and WIM (Hoogewerff) repeat WIM are not yet known to the SD. How is the baby? Who's baby is this, is this Marie van Duyn?
GRIBBAGE (NOL) was in a position to tell the SD about LODEWYK so this information is not surprising. The WIM referred to is COURSING (FRITZ).
B.2289/75. 16th January 1945.
"WE LOST IN ROTTERDAM OWING TO ROLLYP OF CENTRAAL WAPEN MAGAZYN THREE HUNDRED FIFTY STEN GUNS TWENTY FIVE BAZOOKAS TWENTY JRENS ONE HUNDRED RIFLES AND ALE SABITAGE MATERIAL FOR RAILWAY PLAN STOP PLEASE CANCEL LAFAYETTE AND CHEVROLET STOP WE CAN NOT GET ONE RPT ONE STEN OR OTHER MATERIAL INTO ROTTERDAM STOP ALL METHODE OF TRANSPORT KNOWN BY SD RPT SD STOP"
We lost in Rotterdam owing to the rollup of the Centraal Wapen Magazijn 350 Sten guns, 25 bazookas, 20 Brens and all the sabotage material for railway sabotage. Please cancel dropping operations on the grounds Lafayette and Chevrolet. We can not 1 repeat one Sten or other material into Rotterdam. All methodes of transportation are known by the SD repeat SD.
Source is of the opinion that the figures in this message must be too high and he states that RUMMY is not in a position to have such accurate information. Therefore, however, two explanations either of which might reasonably be advanced.
Firstly, there was a drop on the ground LAFAYETTE on 10th January and it may be thought that the weapons which were sent then could not possibly have been in the central weapon magazine when it was taken, because, on the same day that the magazine was reported captured, a message was received that the drop on the 10th had fallen into the river ROTTER: again on the 20th it was reported that all but two of the containers were safe.
Secondly, the exact opposite could be read into these messages since it might well be that RUMMY reported the loss of the weapon magazine on the day on which it took place, while the message about the drop might have been delayed as between the reception committee and the operator, which would account for its coming on the same day and the second message might also have been delayed, which would account for it not being received until the 20th although having been despatched before the 16th, i.e. the day on which the magazine was taken. Even allowing for the second contingency, source still thinks that the numbers of arms captured could not possibly be as high as stated in the message under consideration.
Source went on to say that although RUMMY is kept from all accurate knowledge of the working and details of the organisation, he is nevertheless very quick to act on half-truth: for this reason, ROB, is inclined to dis believe the figures quoted and also to pay not too much regard to the statement about "all methodes of transport" being known to the SD at the end of the message in question.
However, after receiving this message, a message was sent from HQ in ROB's name as follows:
B. 5876. 18th January 1945.
"FROM ROB TO FRANZ AND HANS (2 i/c to ROB in NBS, and 2 i/c KP respectively) GIVE FULL PARTICULARS WITH REGARD TO CENTRAL WEAPON MAGAZINE AND CONDITIONS IN AND AROUND ROTTERDAM WITH REGARD TO TRANSPORT"
and it is a little curious that no reply has ever been received to this message.
On the 17th January a message was received from RUMMY:
"FROM LEO OF KP STOP WITTE PIET WITH FEMALE COURIER TILLY DEPARTED FOR BRABANT WITHOUT ORDERS (i.e. a permit from ROB or his deputy) STOP HAS PLAYED A DOUBLE ROLE SINCE HIS RETURN FROM LONDON AND HAS HAD NO ACTIVE PART IN RESISTANCE STOP HE IS UNRELIABLE STOP"
Source has a very reasonable explanation to give for this telegram, for which see below under heading "WITTE PIET".
B.2301/17 17th January 1945.
"URGENT PLEASE DRYP MAN RPT MAN AND CONTAINERS UORTH HAGUE AT CHEVFDLET STOP CHEVROLET IS SAFE RPT SAFE STOP FROM CHEVROLET WE CAN TRANSPORT IMMEDIATELY MAN AND CONTAINERS TO THE HAGUE STOP AUQHIN RTP AUSTAN AND OTHER ZROUNES READY TO RECEIDE EXCEPT LAFAYETTE AND MAXWVLL STOP"
Urgent, please drop man repeat man and containers (mutilated) Hague at Chevrolet. Chevrolet is safe repeat safe. From Chevrolet we can transport immediately man and containers to The Hague. Austin, repeat Austin and other dropping grounds are ready to receive loads, except the two grounds Lafayette and Maxwell.
The only remarkable feature about this message is the reference to the ability of the organisation to arrange transport in view of the previous statement that "all methods of transport" are known to the SD. The explanation of this is probably that the grounds referred to in this message are very close to The Hague, for which town the drop would be destined and are situated alongside the The Hague/Gouda road so that transport would be a simple matter.
B.2300/16 17th January.
"COMING OUT NEXT WEEK WITH LODEWYK RPT LODEWIJK UWOY YIVE EVERYTHING TO FRITS RPT FRIJS STOP DID I RPT CIDI IJSAPE PERSON AS TINE RPT TINE STOP THE POYS HATE THE EUREKA FOR AT THE FIRST OPERATION ROAD WAS DROPPED ABOUT A MILE WIDE STOP GROUND NOT POSOIBLE TO USE INY LONGER AS AKL PHOPPE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD NOW KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED STOP KD RPT SD PERHAPS TPO STOP"
Coming out next week with LODEWYK (De Stoppelaar) repeat LODEWYK (mutilated) (mutilated) everything to FRITZ (Hoogewerff) repeat FRITZ. DIDI repeat DID is same person as TINE (Gaazenbeek) repeat TINE. The boys hate the Eureka (beacon) for at first operation the load was dropped on an area a mile wide. Dropping ground not possible to use any longer as (mutilated) (mutilated) in the neighbourhood, now know what has happened. SD repeat SD perhaps too.
This message informed us that TIENE, the courier of GRIBBAGE is the same person as DIDI; under this latter name of DIDI she was also a contact of DRAUGHTS-2 (Cor van Paaschen) in The Hague. As she told everything she knows to the SD, and is apparently actively co-operating with them, it must be presumed that she has "blown" any of DRAUGHTS-2 addresses and contacts which she may have known.
B.2397/47 20th January 1945.
"BOYS OF LAFAYETTE RPT LAFAYETTE SAVED WHOLE LOAD EXCEPT TWO RPT TWO CONTAJNERS STOP LAST CONTAINERS IN HANDS OF GERMANS STOP RECEIVED CODES AHYSTALS KTC STOP THANK YOU FOR CHRISTMAS PRESENTS AND SFZUFU COURIERSTERS STOP WILL COME OUT AS SOON AS I CAN BUT AT FIRST I WILL HEAP FRITS RPT FRITS STOP
The boys of ground Lafayette repeat Lafayette saved the whole load except for two repeat two containers. Lost containers feel in the hands of the Germans. I received codes, crystals, etc. Thank you for the Christmas presents and (mutilated) couriers. I will come out as soon as I can but at first I will help FRITS (Hoogewerff) repeat FRITS.
This message is discussed above in connection with the number of weapons thought to have been taken at the capture of the Central weapon Magazine.
Source considers it very undesirable that RUMMY (de Goede) should leave HOLLAND at this time. Had he thought that there was any likelihood of this happening he would never have left HOLLAND himself, because he feels certain that, was he there, he would be able to persuade RUMMY to carry on with his work. LODEWYK (de Stoppelaar) can de spared quite easily and without necessitating ant re-arrangement, but RUMMY is a very valuable member of the team after 4 or 5 months work and the contacts which he has and source does not, at this stage, want to have to start building up everything all over again so as to enable WIM (Hoogewerff) to take over RUMMY's work.
B.2398/35 20th January 1945.
"EUREKA WILL BE USED ON CHEVROLET RPT JHEVROLET STOP TOLD BOYS YOUR MESSAGE TWO SEVON ANA THEY UNDSETAND STOP RECEPTION ROLLS ROYCE WAS THERE ON SUNDAY NIGHT AND STILL READY STOP WILL USE CODE NR FOUR THREE HWO THREE DOR ALBERT STOP PFEDNE DROP FOT BOYS OF LAFAYETTE SOME SHAG RPT SHAG ON CHEUROLET THEY EARN IT STOP WILL END MY MESSAGES TO YOU MONDAY RPT MONDAY STOP FRITS RPT FRITS CARNIES ON WITG MY CODES STOP"
The Eureka beacon will be used on ground Chevrolet repeat Chevrolet. Told the boys about your message 271, they understand. The reception committee was on ground Rolls Royce Sunday night and are still ready to receive a load. Bert de Goede will use code sheet number 4323 A for Albert. Please drop for the boys of Lafayette some shag (tobacco) and also on ground Chevrolet, they earn it. Will end my messages on Monday repeat Monday (22 January). Frits repeat Frits will carry on with my codes.
This concludes the set of messages which were discussed with ROB (van der Stoep).
All these messages had been passed since source left HOLLAND and so this was the first time he had been completely in the operational picture since leaving his own country. Source's reaction upon seeing these messages was one of a certain amount of dismay at the bad turn which things had taken; he was convinced that things had gone wrong, but was also of the opinion that he could put them right again and that the situation was by no means past saving.
24th January, 1945
INTERROGATION OF ROB @ MAGNUS VAN SCHELVEN
@ VAN SEVENHUIZEN
@ De WIT
@ RIEN
Owing to the special circumstances surrounding ROB's arrival in the UK and prevailing at that time, his interrogation has been carried out in two parts. For the purpose of conciseness and easy reference, however, the report of both interrogations included in this document by arrangement with the Security Authorities who carried out the first of these.
EARLY LIFE.
Van Schelven went to elementary school at Rotterdam and this was followed by HBS and engineering school. By then continued with evening classes at technical school while by day, for his practical work, he was employed with the V.I.R. electric lamp works, with which firm he remained until 1939. Thereupon he obtained employment with the JANIN confectionery factory, where he became chief of the technical department and drawing office. Since the end of 1941/beginning 1942 he had been allowing his work to drop off, only going in for a few days each week. This was possible in his position in order to devote himself to resistance work.
START OF RESISTANCE WORK.
He states that he had already commenced in this field during the disastrous days of May 1940, when Naval personnel were assisted by him, together with Frits RUYS, a student of economics (since killed) and son of the RUYS Handelsvereeniging of Wassenaar or Voorburg and Annie VAN ALPHEN of the Wildeveenstraat, Rotterdam, who was later VAN SCHELVEN's courier. This group of students clubbed together under Pa RIEDE, proprietor of the student's boarding- house at 21 Claas de Vrieslaan, Rotterdam.
This was the beginning of VAN SCHELVEN's clandestine work and was followed by assistance to students, military personnel and Jews; he also worked successively with:
"VRIJ NEDERLAND"
"TROUW"
"ONS VOLK"
Contact with "VRIJ NEDERLAND" was through Charles Van der SLUIS, a student of economics and son of Harbour works director of 52 or 54 Vredenhoflaan, Kralingen. the leader of "TROUW" is described as being a certain DRIES and contact with him was via HAN and WIM, two other students of economics and contacts of Van der SLUIS. Contact with "ONS VOLK" was also via Van der SLUIS and VAN SCHELVEN adds that the chief editor was HAN, already referred to, while they all contributed to it and VAN SCHELVEN further assisted with the distribution.
Other persons mentioned in connection with his work are:
Max PINO. Son of a Netherlands Indies official of Koningsplein, The Hague and who is a contact man with the I.D. (Dutch Intelligence Services).
Huib or Huug de YONG. Mechanical engineer and son of a former Mayor of Semarang, Netherlands Indies. DE YONG lives in Vijverlaan, Rotterdam. He is said to have 2 brothers in the UK.
LATER DEVELOPMENTS.
According to VAN SCHELVEN, through their journalistic work they they found that they learned that a lot of things could be done and therefore decided to form a ROTTERDAM KP sabotage group and the following were added:
1. Frans DIJKSHOORN. Son of the director of the clothing business of that name of the Binnenweg, Rotterdam whom the son has superseded in this function. Their address is at Hillegersberg, Rotterdam.
2. 'CHRIS', age 28-32. Student of economics and a native of Twenthe.
This occurred about the end of 1943/beginning of 1944 and the group was known as the KP of RIEN (Van Schelven). The latter mentions that there were other groups i.e. that of Paul ESMEIJER, engineering school teacher, Rotterdam. Who had with him a certain 'ANTON', student and 'THEO', a baker by profession. Then there was the group of Cornelis BITTER @ KEES-ZUID, about whose case VAN SCHELVEN produced a memorised report to 21st Army Group. BITTER, who was also a student, had in his group 'KLEINE JAN', BOERE PIET and 'EDDY'.
THE STAND OF THE PRESENT REGIME.
In June 1944, it became essential to co-ordinate te working of the various groups and Paul ESMEIJER became leader of the ROTTERDAM KP. VAN SCHELVEN, in the name of ROB, superseded him about September 1944 as it was found that he was not cut out for this job.
They carried on their sabotage work, passing the products of their raids, such as rations cards, identity cards, etc to the LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE (LO). This man's real name id Georges of Theo ELSINGA, aged 45/50, he is a former head of the 'FRIESCHE DAGBLAD' (newspaper) of 189? Mathenesserlaan, Rotterdam and described as a personal friend of the Dutch Minister in this country, Professor GERBRANDY.
CONTACT WITH LONDON.
VAN SCHELVEN states that the KP had radio contact with the UK through the liaison officer 'LEO'(note: presumably RUMMY) (Bert de Goede) sent from the UK in August 1944 and who had two operators, one of whom was called 'EDU' (Barmé) and was also dropped back, while the other was 'COR' (Bijsterveld), a locally recruited Merchant Navy mate and produced by 'JOSE' (Elsinga), whose operator he also was.
Contacts also existed with the RVV Organisation through the Rotterdam leader 'Maarten' and 'GERRIT'. the latter is said by VAN SCHELVEN to be Captain HOOGEVEEN, who has been to the UK and is now in Brussels with Prince Bernhard. VAN SCHELVEN further refers to the OD Organisation in the person of 'LANGE WILLEM', who is Willem VAN WIJLEN, an ex-officer and director of CITAX or CITO, transport company of ROTTERDAM and described as leader of the ROTTERDAM OD.
Owing to friction which existed between KP, RVV and OD an attempt - in which VAN SCHELVEN modestly admits he was very successful - was made by him to get all these movements working as one whole and in harmony. he states that instructors were sent out first from the UK and he arranged for these to instruct representatives from the various organisations together, after which they were sent out to instil everywhere the feeling of mutual confidence, which it had been possible to produce in them.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR LEAVING HOLLAND.
Finally there was a meeting at ROTTERDAM about six weeks ago, at which the following were presented:
1. 'PAUL' representative from DORDRECHT.
2. 'TREES' representative from DORDRECHT.
3. 'OOM PIET' leader of the WESTLAND.
4. 'PIET' leader of the WESTLAND.
5. 'DIRK' leader of the WESTLAND.
6. The Gewestelijk Commandant, VAN DER HORSS, whose real name is VAN DER HOEVE, director of a seed merchants
company of Wijnhaven, ROTTERDAM.
7. 'JOSE' mentioned above, leader of LO.
8. 'KAREL' whose real name is VAN SYPESTEYN, a former Dutch Consul in Sweden or Norway, Leader of LO.
9. GEERTSEMA, Gewestelijk Commandant of the OD, whose real name is ROODENBURG, former artillery officer and
ROTTERDAM accountancy.
10. BOS, real name HOLLAAR Leader of the Nat. Steun Fonds for South-Holland, which is the organisation that provides
the financial assistance.
11. 'HANS' of the KP, who has already been mentioned and who is VAN SCHELVEN's deputy.
It seems that, impressed with VAN SCHELVEN's ability, it was generally agreed that he should be the one who should be sent across to unoccupied territory to the Allied Forces. The reason for this were military co-ordination, close radio contact so that everything would be ready when the push came, the question of arms, dropping ground, etc and the discussion of the political aide with the Allied Staff and finally to consult Queen Wilhelmina.
It was further decided that it was desirable for two to go, and VAN SCHELVEN was asked whom he would like to accompany him. He selected 'JOSE' for whom he had much respect as an older sober thinking man, who would help to steady his own youthful enthusiasm, Further, of course. 'JOSE' was well-connected and generally considered by VAN SCHELVEN to be the most suitable person. Unfortunately, he was to fall ill on the way.
CROSSING THE LINES.
They left ROTTERDAM at 17:00 hours on Saturday afternoon, 06-01-1945, but had to spent the night at Rijsoord owing to conditions. From here they continued on the Sunday morning via Zwijndrecht and Dordrecht. On the night of Sunday/Monday they made an attempt to get through from Sliedrecht through the canals by means of a canoe provided by the ALBRECHTS Group of the I.D. courier service, but owing to a snow-storm were unable to make it and had to return to Sliedrecht, where 'JOSE' fell ill.
On Monday/Tuesday night VAN SCHELVEN set off again in one canoe accompanied by 'WITTE PIET', a courier from the Allies who was in another. Unfortunately, VAN SCHELVEN's canoe capsized and he had to swim ashore. It was arranged that 'PIET' should return to ROTTERDAM, while VAN SCHELVEN continued in his canoe to arrive at 01:15 hours at Lage Zwaluwe on 09-01-1945. Here he was picked up by the Americans and after being placed in the OD barracks was subsequently transported via Wagenberg and Breda to Tilburg and from there 3 days later to Eindhoven, where he was seen by the Dutch Intelligence Service. He then proceeded to BRUSSELS for a few days, where he was seen at the headquarters of 21st Army Group and Prince Bernhard's HQ, he was despatched by plane to the UK on 17-01-1945.
DEVELOPMENTS IN HOLLAND DURING ROB'S ABSENSE.
Since the departure of ROB from Holland, mant things had happened which had given rise to a certain amount of anxiety in London, foremost among them a series of messages from the SOE liaison officer in ROTTERDAM, RUMMY (de Goede), which told a tale of the attempted intimidation of this agent by the SD. This series of messages was of course, quite unknown to ROB; the interrogator therefore showed them to him so that he might be fully informed and in a position to give an estimate of the true position from his first-hand knowledge of the arrangements in the field.
PERSONALITIES.
Before studying the traffic, however, ROB identified certain photographs; without hesitation he pointed out the under-mentioned and gave the names by which he knew them in the field, which names were in some cases unknown in London.
Operational Name. Remarks. Field Name (used by ROB).
RUMMY Liaison officer LEO
COURSING (Fritz) Instructor WIM
LUDO LUDO.
PODEX Now in Germany KOOS.
SNOOKER Local recruit, trained in UK and returned to Holland WITTE PIET.
SHOOTING Instructor RVV LODEWIJK.
CRIBBAGE (Theodore) Captured by SD NOL
CUBBING BEN.
After some hesitation source also picked out:
TRAPPING WT operator RUMMY EDU
RECEPTIONS.
Source's earliest contact with CUBBING (Cieremans) and BOATING (Polak) was when he collected them from the reception Committee; he also was responsible for the reception of RUMMY, and GRIBBAGE although he could not remember whether they actually arrived in the field together or came at fairly close intervals after each other. Before they came source said that there was another man (who he insists was dropped alone) who was dropped in the EDE district who was known to WITTE PIET before the war. At the time, it was thought that there was something wrong with this man, whose name source never knew; on WITTE PIET's recommendation, all contact with him was severed. On account of this, source does not know what he did in the Field, but said that he heard later that the man was shot by the SD.
(NOTE: It is thought that this unknown man must have been FARO (Celosse), which supposition is strengthened by the fact that source thinks that his name might have been BOB. FARO was, of course, not dropped alone, but the time and circumstances all points to his being identical with the man referred to by source. Too much attention should not be paid to source's statement that he came alone, since source admits that he only heard about the case from WITTE PIET in conversation on Friday 5th January 1945.
This is very confusing since Bob Celosse (organiser, alias BOB, mission FARO) was dropped 'blind' in the Wieringermeer Polder in North-Holland on the night of 1st April 1944 together with Tony Cnoops (organiser, alias Coster, mission Cricket), Huub Sanders (WT operator to Cnoops, alias Curling or Ivo, mission Swale) and Johan Seijben (organiser, alias Schouten, mission Ping-Pong).
Aart Penning refused to jump (WT operator to Celosse, mission FARO).
Celosse was arrested 19-05-1944 in Amsterdam, Cnoops was arrested 19-05-1944, Sanders was arrested 19-05-1944 and Seijben was also arrested on 19-05-1944.
THE RUMMY TRAFFIC.
The course of the RUMMY traffic was followed with source, concerning at the 11th January 1945, when the following message was received:
B.212715. 11-01-1945.
HAVE NOW CONTACT WITH COURIER STER IF THEODORE RPT THEODORE STOP HE WAL SHNT THORS BY SD RPT SD STOP HANBOOK RPT HANBOOK IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST SD RPT SD MEN STOP HE WANT TO JALK WITH ME STOP WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED STOP
Have now contact with Courier. Is Theodore repeat Theodore. He wil (mutilated) by SD repeat SD. Haubrock repeat Haubrok is one of the highest SD repeat SD. He want to talk with me. Will keep you informed.
Source said that he knew already that the courier TIENE had been allowed to go home after having been interviewed by the Gestapo. The text of the message did not surprise him since he said that if followed very closely the course which the Germans had adopted after the arrest of BITTER. When this man, who was a close friend of ROB's was arrested, the Gestapo sent a message in which WOLK asked for an interview with ROB. WOLK promised to come without arms and said that after an hour's talk he was sure that there would be no further cause for enmity between them.
B.2164/20 of 12th January 1945.
EHFERENCE TINE RPT TINE COURIERSTER OF THEODORE STOP SHE CAM TO ME AND TALK TO ME IN THE NAME OF HAXBOOK RPT HAUBOOK STOP I HAVE HAD ULTIMATUM OF SD RPT SD STOP CAPITUAL CAPITULATE FOR FRIDAY NIGHT TWELFTH JANFARY OR THEODORE KAREL RPT KAREL TONY RPT TONY AND THIRTY RPT THIRTY UNDERGROUND MEN WILL BE KILLED STOP SORDY I WILL MATRY ON RPT YARRY ON STOP ALL PEOPLE SENT BY YOU ARE KNOWN BB SD RPT WU STOP PLEASE WARN HANS RPT HANS FOR SD RPT SD KNOW I HIM BY HEART STOP SD RPT SD KNOWS NAMES LIKE DUIKER RPT SUIKER AND BOREL RPT BOREL STOP I THOUGHT THESE NAMES WERE ONLY KNOWN IN ENGLAND AND NOT HZJE STOP VAN DIR WAALS ALIAS TONY DE WILDE WAS CALLED IN THIS CONNECTION STOP SD RPT SD KNOWS EVERYTHING ABOUT DUTCH COUNTRY SECTION AND POSITION OF SPECIAL TRAINING SCHOOLS STOP CAPT KIZGRWTKING WAL ALSO CALLED STOP SEND YOU MORE INFORMATION STOP CHEERIO".
Reference Tiene repeat Tiene courier of Theodore. She came to me and to me in the name of Haubrok repeat Haubrok. I have had a ultimatum of SD repeat SD. Capitulate before Friday night 12th January or Theodore, Karel repeat Karel, Tony repeat Tony and 30 resistance men will be killed. Sorry I will carry on repeat carry on. All people sent by you are known by SD repeat SD. Please warn Hans repeat Hans for SD repeat SD they know him by heart. SD repeat SD knows names like Duiker repeat Duiker and Borel repeat Borel. I thought these names were only known in England and not here. Van der Waals alias Tony de Wilde was mentioned in this connection. SD repeat SD knows everything about Dutch Country Section and locations of the Special Training Schools. Captain (mutilated) was also mentioned. Will send you more information. Cheerio.
THEODORE is Arie van Duyn, KAREL is Gerrit Reisiger, TONY is Tony Visser and HANS is agent/organiser Tobias Biallosterski.
BOREL is Jan Bockma (WT Operator to Verhoef, alias Halma, mission Fives-I) plane crashed near Makkum in IJsselmeer killing all four agents on board including Pleun Verhoef (organiser for RVV, alias Racquets, mission Fives-I)
DUIKER is Cees Dekkers (organiser, alias Poker) his plane crashed close to airfield Gilze-Rijen, killing all on board.
After the receipt of the first message it would appear as though RUMMY had left a message at the boits-aux-lettres through which TIENE had contacted him and had arranged an address at which he would meet her. Source said that he was quite sure that RUMMY would not have gone to the meeting on 12th January without a bodyguard of source's men. He also gave it as his opinion that it would have been quite impossible for the Germans to have followed RUMMY away from the meeting place, even if they had succeeded in following TIENE to it, which was unlikely.
Source explained that when RUMMY had arranged to meet TIENE he would have followed out the normal procedure which would be to give her an address, it might even be only a street corner, at which she would be picked up by a member of the organisation who would pass her over to another at a second rendez-vous and this would happen perhaps five times in all before she reached the home where RUMMY was to meet her: each man would take all precautions to prevent the Germans following. On leaving the meeting RUMMY would be followed by his bodyguard and would take care to cross some of the deserted parts of ROTTERDAM, areas which the Gestapo will never follow armed men, and then lose himself in the crowds on the BINNENWEG or some other busy street. The home at which the meeting took place would obviously be told to the Germans by TIENE, but would never be used again.
Information contained in the message of 12th January.
Source was not at all surprised to see the names etc, which Rummy says are known to the Germans, because he says he knows that GRIBBAGE (NOL), who was arrested on or about 20th December, 1944 told all that he knew to the Germans almost at once and that TIENE, courier did the same.
At the time of TIENE's enlistment by GRIBBAGE there had been some question on to whether or not she was a suitable person for the work which she was to do, but GRIBBAGE had been loud in her praise and very anxious to have her services; she had been taken on the strength of this and everything had gone well right up until the time of the arrest. they had never had any doubts about or fears for GRIBBAGE's security and the first thing that they knew of anything being wrong was the news of his arrest. Within half an hour of the arrest of GRIBBAGE and TIENE, TIENE was seen by members of the organisation driving around ROTTERDAM in a car with the Gestapo, pointing out all the addresses which she knew. Very shortly afterwards, GRIBBAGE himself made a public appearance walking alone in the streets, but followed at about 15 yards by two SD men, his job being to go up and speak to any person he knew to be engaged in resistance work, and all people so accosted by him were immediately arrested.
B. 2244/39. 14th January 1945.
"NEW GROUND WINTON STOP DUTCH MIL MAP SHEET FOURTY THREE WILLEMSTAD ISSUE NINETEEN ELEVEN STOP THREE NINE POINT SIX AND SEVEN ZERO POINT FOUR RPT THREE NINE POINT SIX AND SEVEN ZERO POINT FOUR STOP WHEN IS ROB RPT ROB COMIN BACK STOP"
New dropping ground Winston. Dutch military map, sheet 43 Willemstad, issued at 1911. 39.6 and 70.4 repeat 39.6 and 70.4. When is ROB repeat ROB coming back?
Source stated that when he was preparing to leave Holland he had arranged that RUMMY that if he was not back in 10 or 14 days, RUMMY should ask UK when he was to be expected. Nevertheless, source is not surprised at seeing this question being asked after only 8 das. He says that it is more or less obvious from the previous messages that RUMMY has had his nerves very severely shaken and under the circumstances, it is not surprising that he is beginning to feel that things are going very wrong and does not know what to do for the best. His indecision and the need for ROB's speedy return is better understood when it is realised that ROB is the only person who has full knowledge of the plans for ROTTERDAM.
In the earlier days of the work in ROTTERDAM the plans which it was hoped to put into effect at the right moment were known to several people, but these plans fell into te hands of the Germans through the arrest of one of the men who knew them. After this occurrence, ROB decided to guard against a repetition and decided to give people only just so much information as they needed for the carrying out of their work from day to day, the result being that he is now the only person who knows all the working of his organisation or its ultimate objectives.
B.2259/4 15th January 1945.
RUMMY reports the capture of the Central Weapon Magazine and also gives an address from which PODEX has written in GERMANY:
"WILL DO ALR UTMOST YOUR TWO FIVE NINE AND TWO SIX ZERO STOP ADDRESS INNOCENT LETTER GERARD RPT GERARD STOP LCDY KERMAN BAHNHOF BAMBERG ABTZU BEGLEITER BAMBER NORIBAYERN STOP CHEVROLET RPR CHEVROLET READY TO VECEIVE STEP GOT JUST MESSAGE CTNTRAA CWAPENMA GAZYTOP NBS RPT NBS IN HAUDS OD SD RPT SD STOP"
Will do our utmost referring to your telegrams 259 and 260. Address innocent letter GERARD (Mulholland) repeat GERARD. (mutilated) (mutilated) Bahnhof Bamberg (mutilated) Begleiter Bamberg North Bayern. Ground Chevrolet repeat Chevrolet is ready to receive containers. Just got a message Central Weapon Magazine from the NBS repeat NBS fell in the hands of the SD repeat SD.
The telegrams from the UK referred to to had to do with attacks on V-weapons. GERARD is PODEX and the address which gives is Leonard G. DIJKERMAM, Bahnhof Bamberg, Oberbayern. This address is identical with that on postcard received in UK from PODEX. the central weapon magazine of the NBS is on a small ship which is moved about from place to place.
In source's opinion the capture of this weapon store would be very disturbing to RUMMY and to the other members of the organisation because they would not know what to do about the second of their stores. There are other stores but the knowledge of these source keeps to himself for the security reasons mentioned above and he does not think that there is anyone in ROTTERDAM at the moment who could handle these matters properly in his absence. Very silly!!
B. 2258/62 15th January 1945.
"SD RPT SD KNOWS EVERYTHING ABOUT LODEWYK RPT LODEWYK STOP HAVE WARNED HIM ROTTERDAM IS TO DANGEROUS FOR HIM STOP LUDO RPR LUDO EDU RPT EDU AND WIM RPT WIM STILL UNKNOWN STOP HOW IS THE BABY STOP"
The SD repeat SD knows everything about LODEWIJK (Luykenaar) repeat LODEWIJK stop We have warned him that Rotterdam is too dangerous for him. LUDO (de Stoppelaar) repeat LUDO, EDU (Barmé) repeat EDU and WIM (Hoogewerff) repeat WIM are not yet known to the SD. How is the baby? Who's baby is this, is this Marie van Duyn?
GRIBBAGE (NOL) was in a position to tell the SD about LODEWYK so this information is not surprising. The WIM referred to is COURSING (FRITZ).
B.2289/75. 16th January 1945.
"WE LOST IN ROTTERDAM OWING TO ROLLYP OF CENTRAAL WAPEN MAGAZYN THREE HUNDRED FIFTY STEN GUNS TWENTY FIVE BAZOOKAS TWENTY JRENS ONE HUNDRED RIFLES AND ALE SABITAGE MATERIAL FOR RAILWAY PLAN STOP PLEASE CANCEL LAFAYETTE AND CHEVROLET STOP WE CAN NOT GET ONE RPT ONE STEN OR OTHER MATERIAL INTO ROTTERDAM STOP ALL METHODE OF TRANSPORT KNOWN BY SD RPT SD STOP"
We lost in Rotterdam owing to the rollup of the Centraal Wapen Magazijn 350 Sten guns, 25 bazookas, 20 Brens and all the sabotage material for railway sabotage. Please cancel dropping operations on the grounds Lafayette and Chevrolet. We can not 1 repeat one Sten or other material into Rotterdam. All methodes of transportation are known by the SD repeat SD.
Source is of the opinion that the figures in this message must be too high and he states that RUMMY is not in a position to have such accurate information. Therefore, however, two explanations either of which might reasonably be advanced.
Firstly, there was a drop on the ground LAFAYETTE on 10th January and it may be thought that the weapons which were sent then could not possibly have been in the central weapon magazine when it was taken, because, on the same day that the magazine was reported captured, a message was received that the drop on the 10th had fallen into the river ROTTER: again on the 20th it was reported that all but two of the containers were safe.
Secondly, the exact opposite could be read into these messages since it might well be that RUMMY reported the loss of the weapon magazine on the day on which it took place, while the message about the drop might have been delayed as between the reception committee and the operator, which would account for its coming on the same day and the second message might also have been delayed, which would account for it not being received until the 20th although having been despatched before the 16th, i.e. the day on which the magazine was taken. Even allowing for the second contingency, source still thinks that the numbers of arms captured could not possibly be as high as stated in the message under consideration.
Source went on to say that although RUMMY is kept from all accurate knowledge of the working and details of the organisation, he is nevertheless very quick to act on half-truth: for this reason, ROB, is inclined to dis believe the figures quoted and also to pay not too much regard to the statement about "all methodes of transport" being known to the SD at the end of the message in question.
However, after receiving this message, a message was sent from HQ in ROB's name as follows:
B. 5876. 18th January 1945.
"FROM ROB TO FRANZ AND HANS (2 i/c to ROB in NBS, and 2 i/c KP respectively) GIVE FULL PARTICULARS WITH REGARD TO CENTRAL WEAPON MAGAZINE AND CONDITIONS IN AND AROUND ROTTERDAM WITH REGARD TO TRANSPORT"
and it is a little curious that no reply has ever been received to this message.
On the 17th January a message was received from RUMMY:
"FROM LEO OF KP STOP WITTE PIET WITH FEMALE COURIER TILLY DEPARTED FOR BRABANT WITHOUT ORDERS (i.e. a permit from ROB or his deputy) STOP HAS PLAYED A DOUBLE ROLE SINCE HIS RETURN FROM LONDON AND HAS HAD NO ACTIVE PART IN RESISTANCE STOP HE IS UNRELIABLE STOP"
Source has a very reasonable explanation to give for this telegram, for which see below under heading "WITTE PIET".
B.2301/17 17th January 1945.
"URGENT PLEASE DRYP MAN RPT MAN AND CONTAINERS UORTH HAGUE AT CHEVFDLET STOP CHEVROLET IS SAFE RPT SAFE STOP FROM CHEVROLET WE CAN TRANSPORT IMMEDIATELY MAN AND CONTAINERS TO THE HAGUE STOP AUQHIN RTP AUSTAN AND OTHER ZROUNES READY TO RECEIDE EXCEPT LAFAYETTE AND MAXWVLL STOP"
Urgent, please drop man repeat man and containers (mutilated) Hague at Chevrolet. Chevrolet is safe repeat safe. From Chevrolet we can transport immediately man and containers to The Hague. Austin, repeat Austin and other dropping grounds are ready to receive loads, except the two grounds Lafayette and Maxwell.
The only remarkable feature about this message is the reference to the ability of the organisation to arrange transport in view of the previous statement that "all methods of transport" are known to the SD. The explanation of this is probably that the grounds referred to in this message are very close to The Hague, for which town the drop would be destined and are situated alongside the The Hague/Gouda road so that transport would be a simple matter.
B.2300/16 17th January.
"COMING OUT NEXT WEEK WITH LODEWYK RPT LODEWIJK UWOY YIVE EVERYTHING TO FRITS RPT FRIJS STOP DID I RPT CIDI IJSAPE PERSON AS TINE RPT TINE STOP THE POYS HATE THE EUREKA FOR AT THE FIRST OPERATION ROAD WAS DROPPED ABOUT A MILE WIDE STOP GROUND NOT POSOIBLE TO USE INY LONGER AS AKL PHOPPE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD NOW KNOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED STOP KD RPT SD PERHAPS TPO STOP"
Coming out next week with LODEWYK (De Stoppelaar) repeat LODEWYK (mutilated) (mutilated) everything to FRITZ (Hoogewerff) repeat FRITZ. DIDI repeat DID is same person as TINE (Gaazenbeek) repeat TINE. The boys hate the Eureka (beacon) for at first operation the load was dropped on an area a mile wide. Dropping ground not possible to use any longer as (mutilated) (mutilated) in the neighbourhood, now know what has happened. SD repeat SD perhaps too.
This message informed us that TIENE, the courier of GRIBBAGE is the same person as DIDI; under this latter name of DIDI she was also a contact of DRAUGHTS-2 (Cor van Paaschen) in The Hague. As she told everything she knows to the SD, and is apparently actively co-operating with them, it must be presumed that she has "blown" any of DRAUGHTS-2 addresses and contacts which she may have known.
B.2397/47 20th January 1945.
"BOYS OF LAFAYETTE RPT LAFAYETTE SAVED WHOLE LOAD EXCEPT TWO RPT TWO CONTAJNERS STOP LAST CONTAINERS IN HANDS OF GERMANS STOP RECEIVED CODES AHYSTALS KTC STOP THANK YOU FOR CHRISTMAS PRESENTS AND SFZUFU COURIERSTERS STOP WILL COME OUT AS SOON AS I CAN BUT AT FIRST I WILL HEAP FRITS RPT FRITS STOP
The boys of ground Lafayette repeat Lafayette saved the whole load except for two repeat two containers. Lost containers feel in the hands of the Germans. I received codes, crystals, etc. Thank you for the Christmas presents and (mutilated) couriers. I will come out as soon as I can but at first I will help FRITS (Hoogewerff) repeat FRITS.
This message is discussed above in connection with the number of weapons thought to have been taken at the capture of the Central weapon Magazine.
Source considers it very undesirable that RUMMY (de Goede) should leave HOLLAND at this time. Had he thought that there was any likelihood of this happening he would never have left HOLLAND himself, because he feels certain that, was he there, he would be able to persuade RUMMY to carry on with his work. LODEWYK (de Stoppelaar) can de spared quite easily and without necessitating ant re-arrangement, but RUMMY is a very valuable member of the team after 4 or 5 months work and the contacts which he has and source does not, at this stage, want to have to start building up everything all over again so as to enable WIM (Hoogewerff) to take over RUMMY's work.
B.2398/35 20th January 1945.
"EUREKA WILL BE USED ON CHEVROLET RPT JHEVROLET STOP TOLD BOYS YOUR MESSAGE TWO SEVON ANA THEY UNDSETAND STOP RECEPTION ROLLS ROYCE WAS THERE ON SUNDAY NIGHT AND STILL READY STOP WILL USE CODE NR FOUR THREE HWO THREE DOR ALBERT STOP PFEDNE DROP FOT BOYS OF LAFAYETTE SOME SHAG RPT SHAG ON CHEUROLET THEY EARN IT STOP WILL END MY MESSAGES TO YOU MONDAY RPT MONDAY STOP FRITS RPT FRITS CARNIES ON WITG MY CODES STOP"
The Eureka beacon will be used on ground Chevrolet repeat Chevrolet. Told the boys about your message 271, they understand. The reception committee was on ground Rolls Royce Sunday night and are still ready to receive a load. Bert de Goede will use code sheet number 4323 A for Albert. Please drop for the boys of Lafayette some shag (tobacco) and also on ground Chevrolet, they earn it. Will end my messages on Monday repeat Monday (22 January). Frits repeat Frits will carry on with my codes.
This concludes the set of messages which were discussed with ROB (van der Stoep).
All these messages had been passed since source left HOLLAND and so this was the first time he had been completely in the operational picture since leaving his own country. Source's reaction upon seeing these messages was one of a certain amount of dismay at the bad turn which things had taken; he was convinced that things had gone wrong, but was also of the opinion that he could put them right again and that the situation was by no means past saving.
POSSIBLE RESULTS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.
The interpretation which source has placed upon the messages referred to above seems reasonable enough. At the same time his hopes of being able to save the situation are based upon one thing and one thing only, namely the inability of the Germans to follow RUMMY from the place of his meeting with TIENE.
PROBABLY ACTION OF RUMMY.
Before source left HOLLAND, he told RUMMY the address of the HQ of KP and said that if ever he, RUMMY, was in trouble, he could , as a last resort, go to that address where he would be sure of finding one or other of the sub-leaders of the organisation. Source is certain, from his knowledge of RUMMY, that the interview with TIENE will have been quite sufficient to send RUMMY to the HQ of the KP. If, therefore, the Germans have been able to follow him, it is more or less certain that the complete roll-up of Resistance in ROTTERDAM will not be long delayed.
ACTION TO BE TAKEN.
Source is firm in his conviction that RUMMY will have been able to escape from observation by the SD and says that if he returns to HOLLAND he can pull things together again. The test will, of course. come 26th/27th January when RUMMY is supposed to leave HOLLAND; if he arrives, it will be fairly certain that he has not only eluded capture himself, but will have been successful in covering up the visit which ROB is sure he will have made to the HQ. If, on the other hand, RUMMY does not get out of HOLLAND as planned precautions will have to be taken as though the worst has happened. In this event, source says that he would like to be dropped in the Utrecht or Gouda areas and would then try to make contact with his own groups in ROTTERDAM through LO who have a lead to the KP and would be able to tell him whether disaster had overtaken his own HQ.
Should RUMMY have been followed to HQ, it would seem almost certain that the Germans would take immediate action, since they could not hope for a better dividend from RUMMY, however long they allow him to run. Source considers it unlikely that news of such disaster would reach the UK, because the normal operator RUMMY, would be arrested with the others and the only other channel of communication which exists is the sender FOXTROT, but this can only be contacted from the UK and the people in ROTTERDAM do not know of the means reaching this operator, while he himself is not in touch with them from his …
WITTE PIET.
WITTE PIET (Piet de Beer) was originally a local recruit in the resistance movement in ROTTERDAM and was sent to ENGLAND on the orders of the KP in October last. These orders, source stated, were very precise and gave him certain tasks which he was to carry out in ENGLAND. He was then to receive further training and return to his own country. Source was at pains to stress that WITTE PIET had been particularly selected for this mission and ascribes some of the difficulties which have since been encountered as due to the way in which he failed to discharge it.
When WITTE PIET first crossed the lines into Allied territory he had come straight from ROTTERDAM where every effort was being made on the part of resistance to sink political differences and for people of all parties to work together for a common end, but immediately on crossing the Allied lines WITTE PIET found himself in an atmosphere of political friction and intrigue and it is source's opinion that this had a very serious effect on his morale. WITTE PIET had feelings, which source himself experienced to a certain degree, disillusionment and anti-climax and was a little apt to adopt the attitude,
"Why should we fight and struggle like this when others who are supposed to be helping us are more interested in political manoeuvring for the post-war period".
As a consequents of this, when he returned to HOLLAND, there were many things which he should have told to his superiors in KP, but which he instead kept to himself, while on the other hand, he was apt to cause a certain lowering of the morale by telling the people with whom he came into contact of his experiences in Allied occupied territory. Source himself says that in order to keep up the enthusiasm of his men, he finds himself very often in the position in which he has to speak to them of all the good things of which he knows while deliberately suppressing some of the less satisfactory aspects.
In view of this change that had been worked upon WITTE PIET, the leader of the KP expressed the opinion that when he returned to HOLLAND WITTE PIET was not at all the same man as when he left. They thought there was something seriously saden (?) with him, and his efforts to try to get things into his own hands led them to sever contact with him. As a result of this loss of confidence and its consequences, source spoke to WITTE PIET at the end of 1944 and asked him what was really in his mind, whereupon WITTE PIET confessed to his disillusionment and said that he was more then ever convinced that the only hope of success remaining in enemy-occupied HOLLAND was to eliminate party differences as between the OD, KP and RVV and work together as one body, i.e. NBS. Source says that WITTE PIET has the right ideas but unfortunately has set about putting them into practice in the wrong way. The mischief which this had done was somewhat increased by the hand of the RVV in ROTTERDAM being very unsuitable and also by the fact that the head of KP had broken away from WITTE PIET.
Further symptoms of the discord which existed at the end of the year (1944) were given by source when he said that WITTE PIET nominated another man as leader of the RVV -DICK- whereupon the previous leader had approached source to have this man shot. As a result of these differences; WITTE PIET had a meeting with RUMMY and afterwards WITTE PIET saw the leader of the KP AMSTERDAM while RUMMY came to source in his capacity of leader of the KP ROTTERDAM and it was agreed that the present leader of the RVV was unsuitable and the suggestion was put forward that ENGLAND should be asked to sent officers to take over the military leadership. Source said that the idea appealed to him, but they must approach this matter through the top of the organisation; further enquiries were made about the man DICK who was supported by WITTE PIET in the early stages, but apparently this support was withdrawn later on. It was not clear what DICK's position is at the moment as source then left for ENGLAND.
On Thursday night, January 4th 1945, source and WITTE PIET spoke together and source told him about the arrangements for his own journey to the UK, whereupon WITTE PIET asked to be allowed to accompany him, and source agreed. On the next night, Friday, source had the task of executing BITTER and, as a result of this, he had not time ti inform RUMMY that he and WITTE PIET would travel out of Holland together with JOSE (Tjerk Elsinga). Since no-one is now allowed to leave occupied HOLLAND without the consent of source or his deputy, it is for these reasons that RUMMY had suspected WITTE PIET and has informed the UK of his unreliability. The message should, therefore, obviously be disregarded since it arises simply from lack of information.
RECENT EVENTS IN REGARD TO WITTE PIET.
The UK has now been informed that WITTE PIET has come safely out of HOLLAND, this in spite of the fact that after his first abortive attempt, source tried to stop him from coming Source had seen MIMI in Allied-occupied territory and as she was going back into occupied HOLLAND, had asked her to give a message to WITTE PIET to return to ROTTERDAM. It is obvious that MIMI did not make contact with WITTE PIET and that he came out, adhering to his original plan. WITTE PIET has brought with him his courier TILLY (Janny Sissingh). The exfiltration of this girl is contrary to source's orders which were clearly given before he left. Who is MIMI?
EXFILTRATION OF RUMMY.
RUMMY, having been ordered to come out of HOLLAND by the UK, is trying to carry out these orders. Source thinks that his own men in ROTTERDAM will try to dissuade RUMMY from this course, but that they will not have sufficient influence with him to overrule orders from the UK. Further messages received from RUMMY lead us to suppose that he is trying to arrange to come out of HOLLAND in company with CUBBING (Cieremans). The only methode of initial contact with CUBBING is via the heads of the KP in UTRECHT, AMSTERDAM and ROTTERDAM. Another contact of RUMMY who may be of importance and should certainly be considered in relation to German penetration is COR (Bijsterveld), the operator on the internal wireless network. This man is a Merchant Navy officer who was recruited locally by JOSE, leader of the LO in South-Holland. COR and RUMMY meet at an address provided by source, sometimes as often as twice a day, the meetings always being arranged by source himself. This procedure, however, is no real safeguard during source's absence because COR's true name and address of the house where he lives are known to RUMMY, although they are not known to source himself. The first contact which these two operators had was on the day of GRIBBAGE's arrest.
NAMES MENTIONED IN TELEGRAMS.
In RUMMY's message of the 14th January 1945, the names are mentioned - GERARD and MAX - as being known to the SD. Source thinks that these may possibly be GERRIT, who is one of his officers in the KP and MAX, who is head under source, of the food organisation for South-Holland. Source has known MAX for three or four years and is of the opinion that the Germans most certainly know his name.
GRIBBAGE (NOL).
Source knows that GRIBBAGE has told everything which he knows to the Germans as stated above, and feels neither surprised nor resentment at this. Source explains that there was a big psychological difference as between people who work in the resistance in HOLLAND and those who are sent from this country (Who all escaped from the same country!). The latter he said, always feel that the Germans are quite super-human, whereas the former know that they are only ordinary people and make frequent mistakes and are not as clever as they sometimes appear. In addition to this, agents who go from this country always feel that they have a way out, while those who have spent their whole time in HOLLANS, know that they must have to stay there and carry on. (This is so much rubbish)
In contrast to GRIBBAGE, source quoted the example of one of his closest friends, a certain FRITZ, who worked with him and who was of a very weak constitution and easily hurt; this man was captured by the SD and knew that he would be tortured and furthermore, that if they hurt him he would most certainly speak. His mental courage, however, was so great that at his first interrogation by WOLK he immediately admitted to having done everything that he had done of which the Germans knew and also to those things which they knew had been done by source himself. Having done this, FRITZ then proceeded to lose his temper and abuse his interrogator, knowing full well that this was the best way to make them lose their temper; this they quickly did, with the result that he was taken outside and shot immediately. This very fine example of courage on the part of FRITZ was responsible for saving the organisation at what might otherwise have been a very difficult time.
Is dit Frits Ruys? In 1944 gefusilleerd door de Duitsers op de Kralingse schietbaan vanwege verzet, na verraad door een medestudent.
BITTER.
Source has submitted a separate and very full account of the BITTER affair, but added to it that he had examined BITTER's body after he had shot him and said that it still bore the marks of the rigorous tortures to which this man had been submitted when in the hands of the SD. (Cornelis Bitter was shot by J.P.M. de Bie, alias PIERRE)
LINDEMANS.
Source has also brought with him a report which he received from RUMMY on the brothers LINDEMANS. This report was sent as a result of a request from the UK, but is clearly inquorate, if not in detail, at least in the interpretations which are placed upon it. It remains one of the inexplicable features of this case that source has no knowledge whatever and does not think that RUMMY has any knowledge either, of the message which was sent to RUMMY via GRIBBAGE on the 22nd November 1944, stating that: "Chris Lindemans is a confessed traitor in Allied hands". It should be remembered that at this time there was no suspicion whatever about GRIBBAGE's security and that the arrest of this operator did not take place until a month later.
GERMAN PERSONALITY.
The importance which the Germans are obviously attaching to the case of GRIBBAGE and RUMMY can best be assessed by the people who are engaged on the case:
KIESEWETTER. This is Major KIESEWETTER, chief of the Counter Espionage Section of AST The Hague, who is a sabotage expert.
ANTON VAN DER WAALS.
This is ANTON DE WILDE who, source says, is extremely busy at the present time, travelling all over HOLLAND and coming to ROTTERDAM two or three times a month. he is now reported to wear a bullet-proof vest. This man is very well known to us as the "German" agent in the Low Countries and he has to his discredit a long and highly successful career on behalf of the SD. It is interesting to note that source is convinced by reason of a BBC message that VAN DER VLIET came to HOLLAND from the UK four of five months ago and has contact with this country. This technique, which is based upon the misuse of BBC messages by a German agent, is an extremely old one, and vey well known. It seems extraordinary, but is nevertheless a fact, that VAN DER WAALS has been successfully employing this method of gaining peoples' confidence for the past three years and has, throughout that time, succeeded in convincing people as astute as source of his bona fides.
Source states that his organisation is, at the present time, in some danger from VAN DER WAALS in that this agent has gained the confidence of WILTON, the son of the proprietor of the shipyard of that name. This boy, being the proprietor's son, is free to go where he likes in the yard and, although he knows that he may accidentally stumble upon a store of weapons which source keeps on the premises of this firm. Source thinks that at the present time the young WILTON, convinced that VAN DER WAALS is a true patriot, is giving him information which he acquires about ships and ship-building in ROTTERDAM generally.
POINTS FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION.
Arising out of this report, the following points seem to be these to which special attention should be directed:
A. The turning point on the RUMMY (Bert de Goede) messages which, as stated above, is the possibility of the Germans not
having been able to follow RUMMY to the HQ of the KP, to which place it seems certain that he would have gone.
B. RUMMY's contacts with the WT operator, COR (Bijsterveld) and CUBBING (Cieremans).
C. A possible tie-up with DRAUGHTS-2 (Cor van Paaschen) through the courier TIENE @ DIDI (Gaazenbeek).
D. The unexplained non-delivery of the message of the 22nd November about LINDEMANS.
E. A possible weakness through the contact of WILTON with VAN DER WAALS.
In assessing the value of this report, the personality of source should be borne in mind; the impression which he created was very favourable and he is undoubtedly a bold and idealistic young man who has one object and one object only at heart - to unite all true patriots in the struggle against the occupying power. He has had a long and very successful career in resistance work, but he is young and his very success tends to make him, if anything, rather over-self-confident. Of his sincerity and genuine desire to advance the aims and objects of the Allies, there can be no doubt, but, as is instanced by his impression of VAN DER WAALS and by various other points in his story, there can be no doubt that his close proximity to the work in hand has not enabled him to see certain aspects of in a true perspective which is better obtained from a more detached viewpoint.
Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945 ondervraging Didi Gaazenbeek.
Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945 ondervraging Arie van Duyn.
Marinus van der Stoep (Beesd, 27 september 1917 - Rotterdam, 6 april 1945) was een Nederlandse verzetsstrijder tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog.
Van der Stoep (schuilnamen: Rob en Rien), was een leider in de Rotterdamse illegaliteit. Achtereenvolgens was hij leider van zijn eigen onafhankelijke knokploeg, leider van de Landelijke Knokploegen (L.K.P.)-Rotterdam en districtscommandant van de Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten (B.S.).
Van der Stoep woonde op kamers in Rotterdam en werkte er als assistent-bedrijfsleider in de Jaminfabriek aan de Hugo de Grootstraat. Hij begon zijn illegale werk met het verspreiden van de illegale krant Ons Volk en hij stelde soms een auto van Jamin beschikbaar voor transporten van dit blad. Daarnaast hield hij zich bezig met het bijstaan van onderduikers.
Hij vergaarde steeds meer contacten en wilde graag opgenomen worden bij de Landelijke Knokploegen. De L.K.P.-leiding wilde echter niet dat nieuwe leden zich aansloten bij bestaande ploegen. Wel mocht hij - onder strikte voorwaarden - een eigen ploeg vormen. Al snel vormde hij - samen met Huib de Iong, Frits Ruys, Charles van der Sluis en Max Pino - deze tweede Rotterdamse L.K.P.-ploeg, welke kwam te ressorteren onder provinciaal leider Samuel Esmeijer. Later zou deze ploeg nog met zeven man aangevuld worden.
In juli/augustus 1944 werd door de inmiddels gevormde knokploeg van Van der Stoep achtereenvolgens het distributiekantoor te Schoonhoven (7 juli), te Nijkerk (3 augustus, mislukt), te Rotterdam-Afrikaanderplein (8 augustus) en te Capelle aan den IJssel (23 augustus) ‘gekraakt’, in combinatie met ploegleden van Esmeijer en de K.P.-Zuid. Daarnaast werden enkele liquidaties van collaborateurs en handlangers van de Sipo uitgevoerd.
Eind oktober kreeg provinciaal leider Esmeijer een nieuwe functie op het hoofdkwartier van de Landelijk Sabotage Commandant als de rechterhand van Jan van Bijnen. Op vijf november nam Van der Stoep zijn plaats in als Commandant van de L.K.P.-Rotterdam. In zijn nieuwe functie ging hij zijn werk onmiddellijk decentraliseren, wat onder meer een uitbreiding van het hoofdkwartier inhield. Ook richtte hij de Motordienst (M.D.) op, welke de vervoermiddelen van de ondergrondse zou verzorgen.
Op 1 oktober drongen leden van ‘Ploeg Rien’ het Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau aan de Mathenesserlaan binnen en haalden daar de administratie weg die betrekking had op Rotterdammers die vrijwillig of gedwongen in Duitsland werkten; zulks met het doel dit uitzenden van arbeidskrachten te saboteren.
In de laatste maanden van 1944 werd langzaamaan de invoering van de organisatiestructuur der Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten verwezenlijkt, en medio december werd Van der Stoep aangesteld als Commandant van het ‘Strijdend Gedeelte’ der B.S. in het district Rotterdam.
Begin januari 1945 vertrok hij naar het bevrijde zuiden en van daaruit naar Engeland. Deze missie had tot doel besprekingen met Prins Bernhard en de B.S.-staf te voeren over de strategische plannen van het verzet en een sterke toename van de wapendroppings te bepleiten. Eind februari werd hij boven Berkel gedropt en zette zijn werk in Nederland voort.
Hoewel het niet gewenst was dat Van der Stoep nog persoonlijk aan acties zou deelnemen - als hij ‘ertussenuit geschoten’ zou worden, zou de hele B.S. in Rotterdam op z’n rug liggen - wilde hij zijn mensen de gevaarlijke karweien niet alleen laten opknappen en zou hij als vanouds meedoen. Deze beslissing zou hem later fataal worden.
Bij de overval op de Abwehr, in april 1945, kreeg Van der Stoep een schot in het achterhoofd en overleed enkele dagen later in het Diaconessenziekenhuis. Hij is 27 jaar oud geworden.
De overval op het politiekantoor aan de Haagseveer in Rotterdam (24-10-1944) had ten doel 17 illegale werkers te bevrijden. De overval zou uitgevoerd worden door 19 K.P.’ers onder leiding van Samuel Esmeijer: Samuel Esmeijer (‘Paul’) met twee van zijn ploegleden, Rien van der Stoep met acht van zijn mensen, Jan Arie de Groot (‘Jos’) met drie ploegleden en Kees Bitter met twee man uit Zuid.
Jan de Geus en Eddy Engelkes van de K.P.-Zuid, en Anton van den Hurk en Pieter Simpelaar van de Ploeg Jos vermomden zich als S.S.’ers, J.L. de Jonge wurmde zich in een politie-uniform. Deze laatste belde de afdeling Gevangeniswezen en meldde de komst van vier man S.S. en een man van de wacht (hijzelf) die enkele gevangenen voor verhoor zouden komen ophalen. Aldaar werden de bewakers overmeesterd, de sleutels werden gepakt en aan de hand van een lijst ging men de illegale werkers uit hun cellen halen. Een celspion zei haastig: “Ik hoef niet mee want ik werk voor de Sipo”, waarop hij hard terug zijn cel werd ingetrapt.
De Motordienst der L.K.P. had voor een aantal wagens gezorgd om hun makkers en de ‘buit’ af te voeren. Haastig werd iedereen in de wagens gestouwd - de alarmsirene van het Hoofdbureau was al gaan loeien - en ging het in het donker op Kralingen aan.
Naar bleek waren in het totaal 43 personen bevrijd (25 gevangenen van de S.D., 15 van de Justitiële Dienst, 2 van de Feldgendarmerie en 1 van de Landwacht). Niet al deze mensen waren echter illegale werkers, er zaten ook ‘gewone criminelen’ bij.
De L.K.P.-Rotterdam had via een infiltrante vernomen, dat de Duitse Inlichtendienst (Abwehr) op de Ouddorpweg 33 in Kralingen beschikte over een lijst met namen van de leidende figuren der Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten te Rotterdam, plus een lijst met namen van personen die voor de Duitsers naar het inmiddels bevrijde Zuiden overstaken om daar te spioneren. Dit zou ernstige problemen voor de ondergrondse opleveren. Nu wilde het toeval, dat er twee dagen eerder een loodgieter nodig was, om de waterleiding te repareren. De infiltrante die aldaar werkzaam was - Kitty van der Have - had voor een loodgieter gezorgd; een verzetsman. Deze repareerde de waterleiding, en ondertussen bewerkte hij ook het kelderraam, zodat de K.P.’ers twee dagen later hierdoor naar binnen konden glippen. Op 5 april 1945 zou een groep van tien man het pand overvallen en het archief meenemen: Van der Stoep met vier man van zijn voormalige ploeg, Jan Arie de Groot met drie van zijn mensen en één B.S.’er (de loodgieter). Van der Stoep had de leiding van de overval op zich genomen. Kitty zou die avond daar haar verjaardag vieren met het personeel. Zij zou zorgen voor harde muziek en genoeg jenever om de ‘Herren’ dronken te voeren.
Drie van de tien gewapende mannen, Hendrik Jan Scheffer, Jan Arie de Groot en Van der Stoep, gingen die avond (05-04-1945) door een poortje de tuin aan de achterzijde van de Dienststelle in terwijl de overige 7 leden buiten de tuin wachten op het teken dat zij in actie mochten komen. Amper was het kelderraam geopend, of men hoorde geluiden op het balkon. Dadelijk daarop vielen de eerste schoten. De drie mannen in de tuin renden voor hun leven, net als de 7 mannen buiten de tuin, terwijl er van meerdere kanten met automatische wapens op hen geschoten werd. Onder dit spervuur trachtten alle drie leden in de tuin door het poortje weg te komen. Een van hen viel getroffen neer - in het donker was niet te zien wie en hij kon ook onmogelijk meer worden weggesleept. De boel was verraden. De overval was volledig mislukt.
Pas later kwam men erachter, dat degene die ze hadden moeten achterlaten Van der Stoep was. Hij had een schot in het achterhoofd gekregen en werd door de Duitsers naar het Diaconessenziekenhuis overgebracht. Zij wisten op dat moment niet wie zij in handen hadden gekregen en zijn daar waarschijnlijk nooit achter gekomen. Van der Stoep overleed enkele dagen later zonder nog bij kennis te zijn gekomen.
Source: Wikipedia.
w.mugge@home.nl
The interpretation which source has placed upon the messages referred to above seems reasonable enough. At the same time his hopes of being able to save the situation are based upon one thing and one thing only, namely the inability of the Germans to follow RUMMY from the place of his meeting with TIENE.
PROBABLY ACTION OF RUMMY.
Before source left HOLLAND, he told RUMMY the address of the HQ of KP and said that if ever he, RUMMY, was in trouble, he could , as a last resort, go to that address where he would be sure of finding one or other of the sub-leaders of the organisation. Source is certain, from his knowledge of RUMMY, that the interview with TIENE will have been quite sufficient to send RUMMY to the HQ of the KP. If, therefore, the Germans have been able to follow him, it is more or less certain that the complete roll-up of Resistance in ROTTERDAM will not be long delayed.
ACTION TO BE TAKEN.
Source is firm in his conviction that RUMMY will have been able to escape from observation by the SD and says that if he returns to HOLLAND he can pull things together again. The test will, of course. come 26th/27th January when RUMMY is supposed to leave HOLLAND; if he arrives, it will be fairly certain that he has not only eluded capture himself, but will have been successful in covering up the visit which ROB is sure he will have made to the HQ. If, on the other hand, RUMMY does not get out of HOLLAND as planned precautions will have to be taken as though the worst has happened. In this event, source says that he would like to be dropped in the Utrecht or Gouda areas and would then try to make contact with his own groups in ROTTERDAM through LO who have a lead to the KP and would be able to tell him whether disaster had overtaken his own HQ.
Should RUMMY have been followed to HQ, it would seem almost certain that the Germans would take immediate action, since they could not hope for a better dividend from RUMMY, however long they allow him to run. Source considers it unlikely that news of such disaster would reach the UK, because the normal operator RUMMY, would be arrested with the others and the only other channel of communication which exists is the sender FOXTROT, but this can only be contacted from the UK and the people in ROTTERDAM do not know of the means reaching this operator, while he himself is not in touch with them from his …
WITTE PIET.
WITTE PIET (Piet de Beer) was originally a local recruit in the resistance movement in ROTTERDAM and was sent to ENGLAND on the orders of the KP in October last. These orders, source stated, were very precise and gave him certain tasks which he was to carry out in ENGLAND. He was then to receive further training and return to his own country. Source was at pains to stress that WITTE PIET had been particularly selected for this mission and ascribes some of the difficulties which have since been encountered as due to the way in which he failed to discharge it.
When WITTE PIET first crossed the lines into Allied territory he had come straight from ROTTERDAM where every effort was being made on the part of resistance to sink political differences and for people of all parties to work together for a common end, but immediately on crossing the Allied lines WITTE PIET found himself in an atmosphere of political friction and intrigue and it is source's opinion that this had a very serious effect on his morale. WITTE PIET had feelings, which source himself experienced to a certain degree, disillusionment and anti-climax and was a little apt to adopt the attitude,
"Why should we fight and struggle like this when others who are supposed to be helping us are more interested in political manoeuvring for the post-war period".
As a consequents of this, when he returned to HOLLAND, there were many things which he should have told to his superiors in KP, but which he instead kept to himself, while on the other hand, he was apt to cause a certain lowering of the morale by telling the people with whom he came into contact of his experiences in Allied occupied territory. Source himself says that in order to keep up the enthusiasm of his men, he finds himself very often in the position in which he has to speak to them of all the good things of which he knows while deliberately suppressing some of the less satisfactory aspects.
In view of this change that had been worked upon WITTE PIET, the leader of the KP expressed the opinion that when he returned to HOLLAND WITTE PIET was not at all the same man as when he left. They thought there was something seriously saden (?) with him, and his efforts to try to get things into his own hands led them to sever contact with him. As a result of this loss of confidence and its consequences, source spoke to WITTE PIET at the end of 1944 and asked him what was really in his mind, whereupon WITTE PIET confessed to his disillusionment and said that he was more then ever convinced that the only hope of success remaining in enemy-occupied HOLLAND was to eliminate party differences as between the OD, KP and RVV and work together as one body, i.e. NBS. Source says that WITTE PIET has the right ideas but unfortunately has set about putting them into practice in the wrong way. The mischief which this had done was somewhat increased by the hand of the RVV in ROTTERDAM being very unsuitable and also by the fact that the head of KP had broken away from WITTE PIET.
Further symptoms of the discord which existed at the end of the year (1944) were given by source when he said that WITTE PIET nominated another man as leader of the RVV -DICK- whereupon the previous leader had approached source to have this man shot. As a result of these differences; WITTE PIET had a meeting with RUMMY and afterwards WITTE PIET saw the leader of the KP AMSTERDAM while RUMMY came to source in his capacity of leader of the KP ROTTERDAM and it was agreed that the present leader of the RVV was unsuitable and the suggestion was put forward that ENGLAND should be asked to sent officers to take over the military leadership. Source said that the idea appealed to him, but they must approach this matter through the top of the organisation; further enquiries were made about the man DICK who was supported by WITTE PIET in the early stages, but apparently this support was withdrawn later on. It was not clear what DICK's position is at the moment as source then left for ENGLAND.
On Thursday night, January 4th 1945, source and WITTE PIET spoke together and source told him about the arrangements for his own journey to the UK, whereupon WITTE PIET asked to be allowed to accompany him, and source agreed. On the next night, Friday, source had the task of executing BITTER and, as a result of this, he had not time ti inform RUMMY that he and WITTE PIET would travel out of Holland together with JOSE (Tjerk Elsinga). Since no-one is now allowed to leave occupied HOLLAND without the consent of source or his deputy, it is for these reasons that RUMMY had suspected WITTE PIET and has informed the UK of his unreliability. The message should, therefore, obviously be disregarded since it arises simply from lack of information.
RECENT EVENTS IN REGARD TO WITTE PIET.
The UK has now been informed that WITTE PIET has come safely out of HOLLAND, this in spite of the fact that after his first abortive attempt, source tried to stop him from coming Source had seen MIMI in Allied-occupied territory and as she was going back into occupied HOLLAND, had asked her to give a message to WITTE PIET to return to ROTTERDAM. It is obvious that MIMI did not make contact with WITTE PIET and that he came out, adhering to his original plan. WITTE PIET has brought with him his courier TILLY (Janny Sissingh). The exfiltration of this girl is contrary to source's orders which were clearly given before he left. Who is MIMI?
EXFILTRATION OF RUMMY.
RUMMY, having been ordered to come out of HOLLAND by the UK, is trying to carry out these orders. Source thinks that his own men in ROTTERDAM will try to dissuade RUMMY from this course, but that they will not have sufficient influence with him to overrule orders from the UK. Further messages received from RUMMY lead us to suppose that he is trying to arrange to come out of HOLLAND in company with CUBBING (Cieremans). The only methode of initial contact with CUBBING is via the heads of the KP in UTRECHT, AMSTERDAM and ROTTERDAM. Another contact of RUMMY who may be of importance and should certainly be considered in relation to German penetration is COR (Bijsterveld), the operator on the internal wireless network. This man is a Merchant Navy officer who was recruited locally by JOSE, leader of the LO in South-Holland. COR and RUMMY meet at an address provided by source, sometimes as often as twice a day, the meetings always being arranged by source himself. This procedure, however, is no real safeguard during source's absence because COR's true name and address of the house where he lives are known to RUMMY, although they are not known to source himself. The first contact which these two operators had was on the day of GRIBBAGE's arrest.
NAMES MENTIONED IN TELEGRAMS.
In RUMMY's message of the 14th January 1945, the names are mentioned - GERARD and MAX - as being known to the SD. Source thinks that these may possibly be GERRIT, who is one of his officers in the KP and MAX, who is head under source, of the food organisation for South-Holland. Source has known MAX for three or four years and is of the opinion that the Germans most certainly know his name.
GRIBBAGE (NOL).
Source knows that GRIBBAGE has told everything which he knows to the Germans as stated above, and feels neither surprised nor resentment at this. Source explains that there was a big psychological difference as between people who work in the resistance in HOLLAND and those who are sent from this country (Who all escaped from the same country!). The latter he said, always feel that the Germans are quite super-human, whereas the former know that they are only ordinary people and make frequent mistakes and are not as clever as they sometimes appear. In addition to this, agents who go from this country always feel that they have a way out, while those who have spent their whole time in HOLLANS, know that they must have to stay there and carry on. (This is so much rubbish)
In contrast to GRIBBAGE, source quoted the example of one of his closest friends, a certain FRITZ, who worked with him and who was of a very weak constitution and easily hurt; this man was captured by the SD and knew that he would be tortured and furthermore, that if they hurt him he would most certainly speak. His mental courage, however, was so great that at his first interrogation by WOLK he immediately admitted to having done everything that he had done of which the Germans knew and also to those things which they knew had been done by source himself. Having done this, FRITZ then proceeded to lose his temper and abuse his interrogator, knowing full well that this was the best way to make them lose their temper; this they quickly did, with the result that he was taken outside and shot immediately. This very fine example of courage on the part of FRITZ was responsible for saving the organisation at what might otherwise have been a very difficult time.
Is dit Frits Ruys? In 1944 gefusilleerd door de Duitsers op de Kralingse schietbaan vanwege verzet, na verraad door een medestudent.
BITTER.
Source has submitted a separate and very full account of the BITTER affair, but added to it that he had examined BITTER's body after he had shot him and said that it still bore the marks of the rigorous tortures to which this man had been submitted when in the hands of the SD. (Cornelis Bitter was shot by J.P.M. de Bie, alias PIERRE)
LINDEMANS.
Source has also brought with him a report which he received from RUMMY on the brothers LINDEMANS. This report was sent as a result of a request from the UK, but is clearly inquorate, if not in detail, at least in the interpretations which are placed upon it. It remains one of the inexplicable features of this case that source has no knowledge whatever and does not think that RUMMY has any knowledge either, of the message which was sent to RUMMY via GRIBBAGE on the 22nd November 1944, stating that: "Chris Lindemans is a confessed traitor in Allied hands". It should be remembered that at this time there was no suspicion whatever about GRIBBAGE's security and that the arrest of this operator did not take place until a month later.
GERMAN PERSONALITY.
The importance which the Germans are obviously attaching to the case of GRIBBAGE and RUMMY can best be assessed by the people who are engaged on the case:
KIESEWETTER. This is Major KIESEWETTER, chief of the Counter Espionage Section of AST The Hague, who is a sabotage expert.
ANTON VAN DER WAALS.
This is ANTON DE WILDE who, source says, is extremely busy at the present time, travelling all over HOLLAND and coming to ROTTERDAM two or three times a month. he is now reported to wear a bullet-proof vest. This man is very well known to us as the "German" agent in the Low Countries and he has to his discredit a long and highly successful career on behalf of the SD. It is interesting to note that source is convinced by reason of a BBC message that VAN DER VLIET came to HOLLAND from the UK four of five months ago and has contact with this country. This technique, which is based upon the misuse of BBC messages by a German agent, is an extremely old one, and vey well known. It seems extraordinary, but is nevertheless a fact, that VAN DER WAALS has been successfully employing this method of gaining peoples' confidence for the past three years and has, throughout that time, succeeded in convincing people as astute as source of his bona fides.
Source states that his organisation is, at the present time, in some danger from VAN DER WAALS in that this agent has gained the confidence of WILTON, the son of the proprietor of the shipyard of that name. This boy, being the proprietor's son, is free to go where he likes in the yard and, although he knows that he may accidentally stumble upon a store of weapons which source keeps on the premises of this firm. Source thinks that at the present time the young WILTON, convinced that VAN DER WAALS is a true patriot, is giving him information which he acquires about ships and ship-building in ROTTERDAM generally.
POINTS FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION.
Arising out of this report, the following points seem to be these to which special attention should be directed:
A. The turning point on the RUMMY (Bert de Goede) messages which, as stated above, is the possibility of the Germans not
having been able to follow RUMMY to the HQ of the KP, to which place it seems certain that he would have gone.
B. RUMMY's contacts with the WT operator, COR (Bijsterveld) and CUBBING (Cieremans).
C. A possible tie-up with DRAUGHTS-2 (Cor van Paaschen) through the courier TIENE @ DIDI (Gaazenbeek).
D. The unexplained non-delivery of the message of the 22nd November about LINDEMANS.
E. A possible weakness through the contact of WILTON with VAN DER WAALS.
In assessing the value of this report, the personality of source should be borne in mind; the impression which he created was very favourable and he is undoubtedly a bold and idealistic young man who has one object and one object only at heart - to unite all true patriots in the struggle against the occupying power. He has had a long and very successful career in resistance work, but he is young and his very success tends to make him, if anything, rather over-self-confident. Of his sincerity and genuine desire to advance the aims and objects of the Allies, there can be no doubt, but, as is instanced by his impression of VAN DER WAALS and by various other points in his story, there can be no doubt that his close proximity to the work in hand has not enabled him to see certain aspects of in a true perspective which is better obtained from a more detached viewpoint.
Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945 ondervraging Didi Gaazenbeek.
Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945 ondervraging Arie van Duyn.
Marinus van der Stoep (Beesd, 27 september 1917 - Rotterdam, 6 april 1945) was een Nederlandse verzetsstrijder tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog.
Van der Stoep (schuilnamen: Rob en Rien), was een leider in de Rotterdamse illegaliteit. Achtereenvolgens was hij leider van zijn eigen onafhankelijke knokploeg, leider van de Landelijke Knokploegen (L.K.P.)-Rotterdam en districtscommandant van de Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten (B.S.).
Van der Stoep woonde op kamers in Rotterdam en werkte er als assistent-bedrijfsleider in de Jaminfabriek aan de Hugo de Grootstraat. Hij begon zijn illegale werk met het verspreiden van de illegale krant Ons Volk en hij stelde soms een auto van Jamin beschikbaar voor transporten van dit blad. Daarnaast hield hij zich bezig met het bijstaan van onderduikers.
Hij vergaarde steeds meer contacten en wilde graag opgenomen worden bij de Landelijke Knokploegen. De L.K.P.-leiding wilde echter niet dat nieuwe leden zich aansloten bij bestaande ploegen. Wel mocht hij - onder strikte voorwaarden - een eigen ploeg vormen. Al snel vormde hij - samen met Huib de Iong, Frits Ruys, Charles van der Sluis en Max Pino - deze tweede Rotterdamse L.K.P.-ploeg, welke kwam te ressorteren onder provinciaal leider Samuel Esmeijer. Later zou deze ploeg nog met zeven man aangevuld worden.
In juli/augustus 1944 werd door de inmiddels gevormde knokploeg van Van der Stoep achtereenvolgens het distributiekantoor te Schoonhoven (7 juli), te Nijkerk (3 augustus, mislukt), te Rotterdam-Afrikaanderplein (8 augustus) en te Capelle aan den IJssel (23 augustus) ‘gekraakt’, in combinatie met ploegleden van Esmeijer en de K.P.-Zuid. Daarnaast werden enkele liquidaties van collaborateurs en handlangers van de Sipo uitgevoerd.
Eind oktober kreeg provinciaal leider Esmeijer een nieuwe functie op het hoofdkwartier van de Landelijk Sabotage Commandant als de rechterhand van Jan van Bijnen. Op vijf november nam Van der Stoep zijn plaats in als Commandant van de L.K.P.-Rotterdam. In zijn nieuwe functie ging hij zijn werk onmiddellijk decentraliseren, wat onder meer een uitbreiding van het hoofdkwartier inhield. Ook richtte hij de Motordienst (M.D.) op, welke de vervoermiddelen van de ondergrondse zou verzorgen.
Op 1 oktober drongen leden van ‘Ploeg Rien’ het Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau aan de Mathenesserlaan binnen en haalden daar de administratie weg die betrekking had op Rotterdammers die vrijwillig of gedwongen in Duitsland werkten; zulks met het doel dit uitzenden van arbeidskrachten te saboteren.
In de laatste maanden van 1944 werd langzaamaan de invoering van de organisatiestructuur der Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten verwezenlijkt, en medio december werd Van der Stoep aangesteld als Commandant van het ‘Strijdend Gedeelte’ der B.S. in het district Rotterdam.
Begin januari 1945 vertrok hij naar het bevrijde zuiden en van daaruit naar Engeland. Deze missie had tot doel besprekingen met Prins Bernhard en de B.S.-staf te voeren over de strategische plannen van het verzet en een sterke toename van de wapendroppings te bepleiten. Eind februari werd hij boven Berkel gedropt en zette zijn werk in Nederland voort.
Hoewel het niet gewenst was dat Van der Stoep nog persoonlijk aan acties zou deelnemen - als hij ‘ertussenuit geschoten’ zou worden, zou de hele B.S. in Rotterdam op z’n rug liggen - wilde hij zijn mensen de gevaarlijke karweien niet alleen laten opknappen en zou hij als vanouds meedoen. Deze beslissing zou hem later fataal worden.
Bij de overval op de Abwehr, in april 1945, kreeg Van der Stoep een schot in het achterhoofd en overleed enkele dagen later in het Diaconessenziekenhuis. Hij is 27 jaar oud geworden.
De overval op het politiekantoor aan de Haagseveer in Rotterdam (24-10-1944) had ten doel 17 illegale werkers te bevrijden. De overval zou uitgevoerd worden door 19 K.P.’ers onder leiding van Samuel Esmeijer: Samuel Esmeijer (‘Paul’) met twee van zijn ploegleden, Rien van der Stoep met acht van zijn mensen, Jan Arie de Groot (‘Jos’) met drie ploegleden en Kees Bitter met twee man uit Zuid.
Jan de Geus en Eddy Engelkes van de K.P.-Zuid, en Anton van den Hurk en Pieter Simpelaar van de Ploeg Jos vermomden zich als S.S.’ers, J.L. de Jonge wurmde zich in een politie-uniform. Deze laatste belde de afdeling Gevangeniswezen en meldde de komst van vier man S.S. en een man van de wacht (hijzelf) die enkele gevangenen voor verhoor zouden komen ophalen. Aldaar werden de bewakers overmeesterd, de sleutels werden gepakt en aan de hand van een lijst ging men de illegale werkers uit hun cellen halen. Een celspion zei haastig: “Ik hoef niet mee want ik werk voor de Sipo”, waarop hij hard terug zijn cel werd ingetrapt.
De Motordienst der L.K.P. had voor een aantal wagens gezorgd om hun makkers en de ‘buit’ af te voeren. Haastig werd iedereen in de wagens gestouwd - de alarmsirene van het Hoofdbureau was al gaan loeien - en ging het in het donker op Kralingen aan.
Naar bleek waren in het totaal 43 personen bevrijd (25 gevangenen van de S.D., 15 van de Justitiële Dienst, 2 van de Feldgendarmerie en 1 van de Landwacht). Niet al deze mensen waren echter illegale werkers, er zaten ook ‘gewone criminelen’ bij.
De L.K.P.-Rotterdam had via een infiltrante vernomen, dat de Duitse Inlichtendienst (Abwehr) op de Ouddorpweg 33 in Kralingen beschikte over een lijst met namen van de leidende figuren der Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten te Rotterdam, plus een lijst met namen van personen die voor de Duitsers naar het inmiddels bevrijde Zuiden overstaken om daar te spioneren. Dit zou ernstige problemen voor de ondergrondse opleveren. Nu wilde het toeval, dat er twee dagen eerder een loodgieter nodig was, om de waterleiding te repareren. De infiltrante die aldaar werkzaam was - Kitty van der Have - had voor een loodgieter gezorgd; een verzetsman. Deze repareerde de waterleiding, en ondertussen bewerkte hij ook het kelderraam, zodat de K.P.’ers twee dagen later hierdoor naar binnen konden glippen. Op 5 april 1945 zou een groep van tien man het pand overvallen en het archief meenemen: Van der Stoep met vier man van zijn voormalige ploeg, Jan Arie de Groot met drie van zijn mensen en één B.S.’er (de loodgieter). Van der Stoep had de leiding van de overval op zich genomen. Kitty zou die avond daar haar verjaardag vieren met het personeel. Zij zou zorgen voor harde muziek en genoeg jenever om de ‘Herren’ dronken te voeren.
Drie van de tien gewapende mannen, Hendrik Jan Scheffer, Jan Arie de Groot en Van der Stoep, gingen die avond (05-04-1945) door een poortje de tuin aan de achterzijde van de Dienststelle in terwijl de overige 7 leden buiten de tuin wachten op het teken dat zij in actie mochten komen. Amper was het kelderraam geopend, of men hoorde geluiden op het balkon. Dadelijk daarop vielen de eerste schoten. De drie mannen in de tuin renden voor hun leven, net als de 7 mannen buiten de tuin, terwijl er van meerdere kanten met automatische wapens op hen geschoten werd. Onder dit spervuur trachtten alle drie leden in de tuin door het poortje weg te komen. Een van hen viel getroffen neer - in het donker was niet te zien wie en hij kon ook onmogelijk meer worden weggesleept. De boel was verraden. De overval was volledig mislukt.
Pas later kwam men erachter, dat degene die ze hadden moeten achterlaten Van der Stoep was. Hij had een schot in het achterhoofd gekregen en werd door de Duitsers naar het Diaconessenziekenhuis overgebracht. Zij wisten op dat moment niet wie zij in handen hadden gekregen en zijn daar waarschijnlijk nooit achter gekomen. Van der Stoep overleed enkele dagen later zonder nog bij kennis te zijn gekomen.
Source: Wikipedia.
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